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One of the grand problems of society is to distinguish
between those problems which are soluble by methods
of reason and those which had better be left to
1
preference.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Building highways is certain to cause trouble. The enterprise must contend with the schizophrenia of a populace which
chafes at any obstacle to freedom of movement in its role as
consumer of transportation goods and services and yet demands
in its capacity as landowner, conservationist or merchant that
transportation facilities be constructed (or not constructed) in a
manner which maximizes nontransportation values. Almost
everybody tends to be for highways-provided that they go
through somebody else's back yard while remaining close
enough to his own property to provide access without loss of
other amenities.2 But it is not only that we are differentially
affected by particular highway projects that creates dissension.
Even if we could agree on the broad categories of things that are
valuable to all of us and that we would like considered in
highway planning, 3 we would not be likely to rank them in the
same order of priority. We are faced here, as in so many other
areas, with developing a system of public choice which optimizes
the realization of the demands of the whole populace within the
constraints of limited resources.
The Federal-Aid Highways Acts' solution to this problem
has not been getting a very good press recently. In part this may
be the result of the quite phenomenal number of lawsuits that
have been filed over the past four or five years for the purpose of
enjoining the use of federal funds for particular highway
projects. Press reports of lawsuits pitting citizens' groups against
government functionaries and their bulldozers are likely to
make the government look somewhat insensitive, even boorish,
however objective the reporter (and of course not everyone is
attempting to be neutral or objective) and whatever the technical
legal claims involved or the eventual outcomes in litigation. This
David versus Goliath imagery would seem to apply whether the
2
Compare Hearings oh H.R. 17134 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on
,Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 266-75 (1968) with HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD,
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNITYVALUES (1969) (Special Rep. No. 105).
3
A reasonable consensus listing appears in HIGH WAY RESEARCH BOARD, supranote2,
at 6-7.
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"citizens" are seeking to protect parks, Indian lands, low-income
or minority housing and historic sites, or whether they are
concerned about local businesses, the stately oaks of the rich and
such abstract environmental values as the contours of an ancient
ice-carved valley.
A summary of the federal highway program's popular
criticisms would include: spoiling the landscape; destroying the
inner city; fouling the air; contributing to unemployment, crime
and delinquency; robbing the cities of tax base; intensifying the
housing problem; and preventing the construction of the kind of
transportation that we really peed.4
Because many people take one or all these indictments to be
true, they also suppose that this disaster could not have occurred
without the conscious direction of persons whose self-interest is
served by causing the nation's transportation policy to run
amuck.5 The burden of this Article is that this Devil Theory is
wrong; that while there may be failures in the conception and
execution of highway policy, they are the common failures of
public policy choice in programs of large scale which have
significant and multiple social impacts. The highway program
has its share, but probably no more than its share, of villains.
I shall also argue that the failures of the highway program's
decision process are not easily remedied. There is ultimately a
rather short list of available techniques for improving public
choice. Increased democratization of the decision p rocess, more
rational or systematic evaluation techniques and increased use of
pricing and market allocation probably exhaust the universe.
The analysis which follows will emerge as skeptical about the
application of any of these potential models for reform to the
highway (or to any other public) program, save in combination
and in moderation. "Democracy," "rationality," and "market
allocation" all represent values which are generally recognized
in our society but which often conflict in their operation because
they give different weights to competing interests. For example,
democratic decisionmaking, in the form of majority rule, will
very likely give a different weight to consumer preference than
would market allocation applied to the same investment
decision. The choice of one of these approaches as the sole
method for determining when, where and how we should invest
in public roads may preclude consideration of competing values
4
See,
5

e.g., A. MOWBRAY, ROAD TO RUIN (1969).
See, e.g., B. KELLY, THE PAVERS AND THE PAVED (1971).
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or interests which would be dominant, or at least influential,
were a different method of public choice employed. Moreover,
all of these techniques for making public choices reveal serious
limitations if we attempt to apply them systematically to public
investment problems such as roadbuilding. Thus, if we intend to
optimize the values of the whole society when making decisions
about public roads, careful analysis, moderation and compromise are in order.
I shall begin by describing in some detail the statutory
framework and administrative processes involved in federally
aided highway construction. I shall then survey some of the
stresses that have emerged in the existing decisional system and
the role of litigation and judicial review in "righting the wrongs"
of the highway program. Finally, I shall analyze proposals for
reform which fall roughly under the headings of "rationality,"
"democratization" and "pricing." The conclusion is ultimately
inconclusive, although an argument is advanced for the
experimental introduction of pricing-the only major strategy
for public choice as yet untried in the highway program.
II.

THE STATUTORY HISTORY

The problem of organizing public decisionmaking about
highways is complex. If we ask, for example, whether public
provision of highways should be carved out of the whole of
public policy planning for separate treatment, the answer will
surely be, "no." We will immediately see that highway building
is intimately connected with a whole range of other societal goals
and programs. Surely decisions concerning the allocation of
resources to highway construction are critically relevant to
similar issues with respect to alternative modes of travel. And
even were we to have a general transportation agency, its
relationship to transportation agencies in other jurisdictions and
the potential tensions between the goals of the transportation
agency and those of local land use planners, the state air
pollution control agency, or the department of natural resources
must be considered. Yet existing government organization
recognizes separate agency roles in all these areas. We generally
concede that outside the family unit (and perhaps within it) we
must pursue different purposes through different organs and
coordinate their activities as best we can.
The problems of coordination become even more complex
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when we realize that in addition to definitions of agency role
based on subject matter and geographical jurisdiction we also
find it convenient to provide agencies which specialize functionally (for example, in ratemaking, whether the subject matter
is electricity, insurance or motor freight) or which have a role
which is defined in terms of a particular clientele, such as the
antipoverty agency. Indeed, it may be perfectly rational to
organize administration according to subject matter, geography,
function or clientele, but it is highly unlikely that the structure of
any agency will reflect all these criteria for organization and
hence suit all our purposes.
We generally attempt to make fragmented authority
responsive to our goal of optimizing the demands of the whole
populace by requiring either that an agency established to
implement a particular purpose consider in its decisionmaking
the impact of its decision on other stated societal values or goals,6
or that the agency in some fashion coordinate its action with
other agencies, groups or individuals who represent values that
we wish to be considered or protected Of course, both of these
approaches may be taken concurrently, 8 and there are a
significant number of variations on each. The agency may be
free to pursue its primary mission substantially unrestrained, or
its programs may be subject to vetoes in favor of other interests
or values. The balance to be struck between these extremes will
be the result of a number of competing considerations, including
getting the job done, expertise thought to be required, initial
value orderings, intensity of affected interests and the wit of the
draftsman.
The history of the development of federal standards in the
federal-aid highway program is a history of the growing
recognition of these complexities. Moreover, it is a history which
reveals significant progress toward the goal of responsive,
informed, polycentric decisionmaking.
A.

The Core Developmental Thrust

The initiation of the Federal-Aid Highways Program had a
major impact on the administrative organization of road
6
7 See, e.g.,

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1970) (impact on environmental values).
See, e.g., 40 id §§ 531-54; 42 id § 4201-44.
8The modem federal law concerning standing to review the decisions of
administrative agencies and to participate in their decisional processes suggests that when
an agency is required to consider certain interests or values it is very likely to be called
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building. Until the Federal-Aid Road Act of 19169 roads were
normally built and maintained by localities and turnpike
companies.' 0 With the advent of federal aid the provision of
public roads very quickly became a responsibility largely of state
government with federal assistance. Moreover, the federal
government early recognized the importance of federal influence in the expenditure of grant funds in order to assure the
effectuation of federal policy.'
The federal government's participation in roadbuilding has
always been based on the notion that the primary national
interest involved was the provision of a linked system of toll
free 12 roads, for the movement of persons and goods in interstate
commerce. Hence, aid is available only to the extent that a
project is recognized as a part of a federal-aid highway system,' 3
and the major funding effort has been made with respect to the
primary system which carries largely interurban transportation. 14 To further insure that federal money not be frittered away
on small improvements on diverse segments of roadway, the
percentage of a state's highways that may be included within the
federal-aid primary system is limited, 5 and inclusion within any
system is conditioned upon the road forming part of a longrange plan for development of highway networks to serve the
major classes of travel.' 6
To promote this "systems-development" goal the states are
upon to admit parties who represent those interests into some aspects of its decision
processes. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 733-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1002-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 536, 569-74 (1972).
9
Act ofJuly 11, 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355.
l°SeeNetherton, IntergovernmentalRelationsin the Federal-Aid Highway Program,I URB.
L. ANN. 15, 16-17 (1968).
11
See Message of President Harding to Congress, quoted in id 17-18. The occasional
proponent of contrary views, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 219-20 (1955), has been lost in the deluge of
subsequent legislation.
1723 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). But see id § 129 (allowing toll roads on federal-aid
systems).
131d §§ 103-05.
14The apportionment of "ABC" funds (primary, secondary, urban extensions) has
always favored the primary system of "main highways." See, e.g., Federal-Aid Highways
Act of 1970, § 105, 23 U.S.C. § 105 (1970). Since the creation of the highway trust fund
in 1956, Act ofJune 29, 1956, ch. 462, tit. II, § 209, 70 Stat. 397, the emphasis has been
on completion of the interstate system between major metropolitan and industrial
centers, a policy fostered by completion deadlines, gigantic appropriations and a 90-10
sharing formula, 23 U.S.C. 120(c) (1970).
1523 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1970).
1623 C.F.R. § 1.6(c) (1973). Major classes of travel also include farm-to-market
roads, which have always received federal support, and intraurban traffic, which is
recognized under the urban extensions category and the new urban system provided for
in the Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1970,23 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1970).
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required to have highway departments with sufficient authority
to carry out the duties imposed by federal legislation. 17 This
authority must include responsibility for all projects, whether or
not constructed by the department, and final decisional authority
on matters relating to compliance with federal law." The state
departments have been exhorted to consider local needs to the
extent "practicable, suitable, and feasible,"' 9 and there is a
20
special role for localities in secondary systems planning.
Beyond these requirements federal standards have until recently
been concerned almost exclusively with engineering questions 2 1
or other technical matters unrelated to the planning and location
of facilities.
The federal-state highway engine is fueled by protected
revenues at both the federal and state levels. At the federal level
money is generated by tax dedications to the Highway Trust
Fund,2 2 which until recently has been available only for highway
planning and construction 23 and is still largely restricted to those
purposes. Urged on by the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment of
1934,24 which provided for withholding of federal aid to states
which devoted highway user tax revenues to highway construction at less than their 1934 level, all states have, by custom,
statute or constitution, pledged highway user taxes to highway
construction.2 - As might be expected, the method of funding
highway construction has become a major battleground for proand antihighway forces.

"723 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970).

1823 C.F.R. § 1.3- .4 (1973).
U.S.C. § 101 (b), 109(a) (1970).
1d §§ 105(b), 106(b), 117.
21Id § 109(a)-(f) (encompassing the pre-1970 view). The 1970 Act broadened the
scope of federal concern to include economic, social and environmental aspects of
9
2' 023

construction.
Id§ 109(h) (1970).
22
Act ofJune 29, 1956, ch. 462, tit. II, § 209,70 Stat. 397, as amended,Act of Sept. 21,
1959, Pub. L. 86-342, tit. II, § 202, 73 Stat. 615.
23The Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1973 allows trust funds allocated to any of the
federal-aid systems to be used for the construction of bus lanes, bus passenger loading
areas and parking facilities for "bus and other public mass transportation passengers...."
Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 121(a), 87 Stat. 259. (The 1973 formulation represents some
loosening of restrictions on the use of trust funds for bus lanes and fringe parking
imposed by 23 U.S.C. § 142(d) (1970).) The 1973 Act also makes available trust funds
allocated to the urban system for the construction of fixed-rail facilities and the purchase
of trains and buses. Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 121 (a), 87 Stat. 259-60.
2423
U.S.C. § 126(a) (1970).
25
Netherton, supra note 10, at 27-38. The importance of this self-financing aspect of
highway construction can hardly be overestimated. In Virginia, for example, the
1968-1970 appropriations reveal that the largest item in the state budget was the special
fund appropriation for highways. Commonwealth of Virginia Budget, 1968-70 xvi
(1968).
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B. Socialization Trends
Beginning in 1958 with the requirement that projects
bypassing or going through towns be approved for federal aid
only on certification that opportunity for public hearing has been
afforded and that the economic effects of the location have been
considered,26 a series of interrelated standards concerning
comprehensive transportation planning, local control, citizen
participation, environmental quality, relocation housing and
social values have been grafted onto the federal-aid highway
program. 27 These requirements have been contained not only in
the Federal-Aid Highways Acts, but also in general legislation
such as the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 196828 and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).29
1. The Role of Local Governing Bodies
Although the interests of localities have never been
forgotten in the federal-aid highway program30 the role of the
local governing body has been strengthened recently by
requirements for: public hearings; 3 ' state highway department
certification that highway projects are consistent with the goals
and objectives of local urban planning; 32 cooperative planning
between localities and state highway departments; 33 selection of
routes on the new urban system in cooperation with appropriate
local officials; 34 consideration of views of local governing bodies
in all highway construction within Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSA's) ;35 and local comments on environ36
mental quality questions.
2623 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
1d §§ 128(a), 134, 109(h), 502, repealed Act ofJan. 2,1971, Pub. L. No. 91-646, tit.
II, § 220(a) (10), 84 Stat. 1903.
27

2840 U.S.C. §§ 531-35 (1970); 42 id§§ 4201-44.
2942
U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1973).
30
See23 U.S.C. §§ 101 (b), 105(b), 106(b), 117 (1970).
31

id§ 128.

321 d
33

1n SMSA's a memorandum of agreement with the local governing body
concerning planning is required. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-9,
4(d) (June 21, 1967), as amended (Nov. 24, 1969) [hereinafter cited as PPM 50-9]. Local
interests are given a special place in all federally funded projects under § 401 (b)-(c) of
the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. § 4231 (b)-(c) (1970). This
rule is structured into the review procedure of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-95.

"423 U.S.C.A. § 103(d) (19701.

3IcL § 134 (a). For a requirement that certain controversial projects in the District of
Columbia be restudied with local officials, see Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, §
129, 84 Stat. 1731. But cf 23 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), which allows localities in areas of
critical transportation need to be lumped together for planning purposes by DOT
regulation.
36
See DOT Order 5610.1A (Oct. 4, 1971), which implements § 102(2)(C) of the
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Social, Economic and Environmental Considerations

Under Section 128 of title 23 a state highway department
must certify that it has considered in its location decision for a
federal-aid project "the economic and social effects of such a
location [and] its impact on the environment." This certification
must be accompanied by a report "which indicates the
consideration given to the economic, social, environmental and
other effects of the plan on highway location or design and
various alternatives which were ...

considered." 37 In addition,

federal-aid highway projects must comply with NEPA's requirements, inter alia, of environmental impact statements and
consultation with all federal agencies having authority or
expertise with respect to the environmental impact involved. 38
Whenever a highway project contemplates taking property from
any park, recreation area or wildlife refuge of national, state or
local significance as determined by the responsible jurisdiction, it
may do so only if there is no "feasible and prudent alternative"
and "all possible planning" has been used to minimize harm.39
3.

Planning

In addition to the requirement that state highway departments certify that their projects are consistent with area planning
objectives,4" the Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1962 prohibits
funding any project in a SMSA which is not based on a
"continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process
carried on cooperatively by States and local communities .... 41
This requirement is backed up by planning grants for which
matching may be waived;42 by detailed regulatory prescription
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), by
providing for local inputs through the procedure of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-95.
37

This requirement was previously contained in FHWA Policy and Procedure
Memorandum 20-8,
10b (Jan. 17, 1969) (codified at 23 C.F.R. § 790.9 (1973)), which

also elaborated 23 nonexclusive factors which should be included in "social, economic
and environmental effects." Id
4c. This list has been consolidated to 7 factors. 23
C.F.R. § 790.3(c) (1973). Pursuant to the requirement of 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970), the
Secretary issued, in 1972, new guidelines to ensure full consideration of these factors at
each stage in the development of highway projects on the federal-aid systems. These
guidelines are set forth at 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1 App. A (1973).
38Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 285 (1973); Council on Environmental Quality
Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971); DOT Order 5610.1A (October 4, 1971).
3923 U.S.C. § 138 (1970). See also National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 id
§ 470f (1970).
4023 id. § 128.
41
1d § 134.
42
1d § 307(c)(1). See also23 C.F.R. § 1.26 (1973).
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of the comprehensive planning process;4 3 and by the Bureau of
the Budget's Bulletin A-95 review procedure,44 a procedure by
means of which all affected public bodies are invited to comment
on proposed federal or federally aided projects.
Several steps have been taken recently which increase the
scope and effectiveness of comprehensive transportation planning. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 4" and
NEPA 46 reinforce the connection between planning and the
47
consideration of social, economic and environmental factors.
Fragmentation caused by separate planning programs in multiple jurisdictions 4 was attacked by Congress in the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1970, which enables the Secretary to provide
regulatory charters for regional transportation planning agencies
in corridors where the inadequacy of existing facilities requires
accelerated development of multimodal systems.4 9 Finally, the
1970 Act belatedly supported the commitment to comprehensive transportationplanning by providing highway funds for bus
lanes, fringe parking and other transit-related facilities.5 0 That
support was significantly strengthened in the Federal-Aid
Highways Act of 1973, which made trust funds allocated to the
urban system available for building
mass transit facilities and for
5 1
purchasing buses and trains.

4.
Section 128 of
hearings have been
approval of plans or
FHWA regulations,
43
44

Citizen Participation

title 23 requires certification that public
held or made available when requesting
projects. This requirement is elaborated in
which mandate both a location hearing

PpM 50-9, supra note 33.

BOB Circular A-95, pt. I,

5A provides for comments directed at the relation of

the reviewed project to area comprehensive planning.
C542 U.S.C. § 4231(a) (1970) ("reasoned choices.., between [the Act's] objectives
when4 6they conflict").
1d §§ 4332(2) (A) (requiring that a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" be
employed), 4332(2) (B) (requiring that "presently unquantified environmental amenities
and 47
values" be given appropriate consideration).
Administrator Turner has testified that the comprehensive planning process is the
major component in the Federal Highway Administration's environmental quality
program. Hearings on Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act Relative to
Highways Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess.4 816-17 (1970).
Cf FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 1970
NATIONAL HIGHWAY NEEDS REPORT 16 (prelim. ed. 1970).

4923 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1970).
5
.50d § 142.
1Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 121(a), 87 Stat. 259-60.
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before a transportation corridor is chosen 52 and a design hearing
before the final design of the facility is determined. 53 The
hearings are to be held while the department retains flexibility to
respond to the views presented; general public notice is
required; written or oral statements may be allowed; information on alternatives .considered by the department shall be made
available; a verbatim transcript is taken; and the department
submits the transcript plus a summary and analysis of the views
presented to the federal highway administration. There is even
some language in the regulations which would seem to go
beyond hearings
to a less structured form of "planning with
54
people.5

5.

Relocation

The relocation problem was recognized legislatively in the
1962 Act, which provided matching grants for relocation
assistance.55 In 1968 a new chapter on relocation was added to
title 2356 requiring state assurances of fair and reasonable

relocation payments, provision of relocation services and the
availability of comparable replacement housing "to the extent
that can reasonably be accomplished., 57 Although they have
since disappeared from the highway code, these relocation
requirements formed the model for portions of the Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act of 1970,58 which applies to all

federally funded projects, including, of course, highways.
C.F.R. §§ 790.3(a), 790.5(a) (1973).
5 1d §§ 790.3(b), 790.5(a).
*4 Id § 790.4.
There are also hearing requirements ("whenever appropriate") in § 2(b) of
Executive Order 11,514 of March 5, 1970, 3 id. 285, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970), which
implements NEPA. These requirements seem to be taken care of by the present hearing
process and by combining the hearing data on environmental factors with that produced
by the BOB A-95 review procedure.
55
Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-866, § 5a, 76 Stat. 1146, repealed, Act of Aug.
23, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 37, 82 Stat. 836.
56
Act of Aug. 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 30, 82 Stat. 830, repealed,Act ofJan. 2,
1971 Pub. L. No. 91-646, tit. II, § 220(a) (10), 84 Stat. 1903.
51223
3

5842 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1970). Tracking the language of former § 502 of title 23, §
4630 of title 42 requires that
the head of a Federal agency shall not approve any grant to, or contract or
agreement with, a state agency, under which Federal financial assistance
will be available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or projects
which will result in the displacement of any person on or after January 2,
1971, unless he receives satisfactory assurances from such State agency
that(1) fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance shall be
provided to or for displaced persons, as are required to be provided
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III. BETWEEN THE PROMISE AND
FULFILLMENT LIES ADMINISTRATION

However progressive recent highway and highway-related
legislation, there remains the translation of verbal formulae into
operational realities. As the description of the administration of
the highway program unfolds it may be tempting to suggest that
quite a lot of legislative policy is getting lost in the administrative
translation. On the other hand, we may also find that the
administrator is dealing with problems that were very imperfectly understood by the Congress and for which no useful policy
guidance was provided in the legislation. More important than
these lacunae, however, are the fundamental conflicts which
have appeared with Congress' recognition of an increasingly
broad range of interests and values.
For example, the federal government insists that it be able to
deal with a single state agency having final authority, usually the
state highway department, and then insists that the highway
department adapt to local needs and desires. In the same vein,
the Federal-Aid Highways Acts provide enormous amounts of
protected funds which must be spent by the states on highways or
lost,59 and at the same time require a comprehensive, rational
approach to highway planning which rigorously considers
alternative transportation modes and general social, economic
and environmental values. 60 Further ambiguity is created by the
requirement that the federal administrator consider economic,
social and environmental factors 61 in the absence of established
priorities among them. For it is likely that each consideration
will point toward different conclusions about the location and
design of a highway facility. With such built-in tensions, how
does the system keep operating? The answer must lie someby a Federal Agency under sections 4622, 4623, and 4624 of this
title;
(2) relocation assistance programs offering the services described in
section 4625 of this title shall be provided to such displaced persons;
(3) within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement, decent,
safe, and sanitary replacement dwellings will be available to
displaced persons in accordance with section 4625 (c) (3) of this title.
Unlike its title 23 precursor, the requirement stated in § 4630(3) is not subject to the
condition that relocation "can reasonably be accomplished," 23 id. § 502, but is absolute
on its face.
FHWA's response to this statutory directive appears in Instructional Memorandum
80-1-71, 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1, app. A, at 30 (1973).
5923 U.S.C. § 101 (d) (1970); 23 C.F.R. § 790.8(b)(2) (i) (1973).
6023 U.S.C. §§ 134(a), 109(h) (1970).
61

d § 128(a).
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where in the administrative process by which these conflicting
pressures and demands are harmonized and perhaps in the
nature of the standards themselves.
A.

Administration of the Federal-Aid
Highway Program

Given the number and complexity of standards governing
the construction of federal-aid highways, one might expect that
the major role of the Federal Highway Administration in the
grant process would be that of a federal policeman who carefully
sifts and analyzes all the submissions of state highway departments to document compliance with each federal requirement.
Indeed, this impression is likely to be drawn from any
description of the project approval process.
We might, for example, break up the grant process into four
major stages in the approval of a particular construction
project." The first decision that must be made by FHWA is
whether to add the proposed highway section to one of the
federal-aid systems; this step must precede inclusion of the
project in an annual state highway "program."63 When it asks
FHWA for program approval, the state will have already
determined the need for the highway projects included in the
program, established priorities among those projects, and
coordinated these proposals with state and local planning in a
manner sufficient to satisfy the BOB Bulletin A-95 review
procedure.
The next step is a request by the state highway department
for approval of the location of the project and for authorization
to begin design engineering and right-of-way work. The state
must certify that it has studied alternative locations, prepared an
initial relocation plan, advertised and held public hearing' on the
location if requested, considered the hearing comments, selected
a location and publicized its request for FHWA approval. If
FHWA does not already have documents supporting these
certifications, they will be filed at this time.
The next request to FHWA is for approval of the state's
design plans6 4 and its final right-of-way and relocation plans. At
62The sequence of steps outlined here for approval of federal-aid highway projects
relies heavily on FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,

REVIEW OF FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROGRAMS app. I, charts I-A to I-E (1970)
[hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL-AID PRCGRAMS].
63
See23 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
6
4See23 C.F.R. 790.3(d) (1973).

HIGHWAY DECISIONMAKING

1973]

this point the state must have publicized the previous location
approval, studied alternative designs, developed a final relocation plan, advertised and held a design public hearing if
requested, evaluated the hearing comments and selected a
design, and publicized the request for design approval. The
submission to FHWA is again by certification with accompanying documents, for example the transcript of the design public
hearing. The final stage in committing federal monies for a
highway project is approval of the state's plans, specifications
and estimates 65 on the basis of its certifications, inter alia, of
completion of right-of-way acquisition and provision of relocation assistance.
Discussions with highway administrators indicate that while
this skeleton of the grant approval process may not contain any
false statements, its suggestion of state initiative and planning,
with federal approval based on review of documentary evidence
to evaluate compliance with federal standards, is extremely
misleading.6 6 Rather, the posture of the FHWA, which delegates
virtually all grant approval authority to its division engineer in
each state, 67 is one of helping the state highway department
improve its planning and engineering capabilities through a
process of continuous and close working liaison. The object has
not been to build a record which demonstrates compliance with
all federal standards, but to get the best possible job out of the
highway department in relation to those standards. Approval of
a project seems to be based essentially on that broad criterion.
B.

An Appreciationfrom the A dministrative Perspective

The FHWA's operational posture is sensible from a number
of perspectives. First, the program is a construction program.
Hence, one would think that a managerial model of administration would be appropriate. The questions to be decided are
routinely questions concerning prospective demand, engineering feasibility, design and cost. These are decisions of a type
common in private enterprise, made without extensive documentation or even arm's-length bargaining. Within an efficient
65

66

See24 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).

E.g.* Interview with Mr. Harold C. King, Division Engineer, FHWA, in

Richmond, Va., Mar. 25, 1971. This view is shared by Mr. Edward Wells, Chief Counsel,
FHWA, Washington, D.C., whose comments on a draft containing the present language

were6 7received in the spring of 1973.

See FEDERAL-AID PROGRAMS, supranote 62, at 31.
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managerial system one expects that there will be no neutral
arbiters, that choices will be made under conditions of significant
uncertainty after determination that some facts are not likely to
justify the expense of an attempt to uncover them. It is also
presumed that certain divisions or delegations of function are
made and relied upon.
There is much in the federal-aid highway program's
statutory framework which is consistent with these notions.
Although the relationship between FHWA and state departments is in some sense hierarchical, there is no provision for
administrative appeal from the decisions of the grantor agency.
Disagreements must be resolved by negotiation or be allowed to
develop into intergovernmental political squabbles, which cause
the program professional to lose control of his program. While
the legislation requires that certain factors be considered, there is
no specification of the detail with which they must be
investigated or of the weight to be assigned to them in arriving at
a final judgment. 8 Certain questions are delegated to the grantee
on condition only that it certify that the requirements have been
69
fulfilled.
Second, the program that is being administered is a grantin-aid program. This fact implies at least some recognition of
substantial discretionary authority in the grantee. That authority
may emanate from constitutional notions of division of powers,
from historical operating relationships in the particular field
involved or from a recognition of limited federal purposes. From
wherever it comes, and it is likely to come from all these sources,
the recognition of discretionary authority in the grantee
produces an attitude of cooperation and negotiation which
eschews formality and an appeal to strict rules of law.7"
The question, finally, is whether the conditions imposed on
highway grants by the federal-aid highway legislation render
these "managerial" and "intergovernmental" perspectives inappropriate. It seems sensible to conclude that they do not; that, in
68
6 9See,

e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
The Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1973 greatly expands this class of questions
with its provision for "certification acceptance." Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 116(a), 87 Stat. 258.
Rather than review (or have his delegate review) each project at each step in its progress
to completion, the Secretary may accept certification from the state under new § 117(a)
of the highway code that projects will be carried out in accordance with state
requirements at least as stringent as those established by the Federal-Aid Highways Acts.
The Secretary need make only a final inspection of a project completed under this
arrangement.
7"See generally M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS ON PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1970).
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fact, the federal requirements are drafted to preserve the
compromise that "aiding" rather than "operating" programs
generally imports; and that these requirements may quite
properly be read as unsuited to an "enforcement oriented"
administrative posture. Let us look back briefly at the requirements in order to develop with somewhat more specificity what
they do, and do not, provide.
1. Need
On coming initially (or naively) upon the federal-aid
highway program one might expect to find some criteria in the
legislation for use in determining when highways are needed. At
a minimum one might expect a system of priorities. There is
neither. The Congress designated the terminal and connecting
links in the interstate system,71 for instance, and otherwise left
need determinations to the states 72 and the localities. Indeed, the
Secretary of Transportation is precluded by statute from using
his authority to develop criteria for the evaluation of transportation investments when federal-aid projects are involved.73 But
while there are no federal legislative criteria for determining
highway needs, the availability of federal-aid funds provides a
very strong incentive for identifying such needs.74
7'23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(1) (1970). This section provides that the interstate system
"shall be so located as to connect by routes... the principal metropolitan areas, cities,
and industrial centers ... and ... to connect at suitable border points with routes of
continental
importance in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico."
72
0f course, that determination by the states must take into account certain aspects
of the federal program which may be more influential: that more money on better terms
is available for interstate projects; that since the federal share of the costs of federal-aid
highways is 70 to 90% the marginal benefits to the state need be only 10 to 30% of the
benefits required from fully state-funded projects; that in rural areas at least roads are the
only transportation facility with guaranteed aid; and that there can be no swapping of
entitlements among states when the aid distribution formula gives Connecticut too much
and Nevada too little. See Nelson, Policy Analysis in Transportation Programs, in 3
SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT OF THEJOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 91ST CONG.,
1 ST SESS., ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPM SYSTEM, 1102,

1119 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS OFPUBLIC EXPENDITURE].
7349 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (1970). For a political history of this section, seeJ. BURBY,
THE 7GREAT
AMERICAN MOTION SICKNESS 40-44 (1971).
4
Assuming his not unaccustomed role of a voice
crying in the wilderness, Senator
Proxmire testified in 1970:
Only if Congress insists on obtaining the best possible economic
information and analysis, so that the social value of highway investment can
be compared to the value of other types of transportation investment and to
the value of nontransportation uses of Federal funds, will we be able to
make an informed judgment as to how many additional highway miles we
"need."
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At the state level the determination of "need" tends to be a
function of professional planning and political logrolling. The
highway program is a major, if not the major, pork barrel for
state legislatures, and the legislative branch almost always has an
opportunity to make the final decision on projects of any
significance either by specific designation or through the
appropriations process. Hence the highway department must
plan its projects with a wary eye on the people's representatives,
who generally view public works projects in their districts as a
very good thing. But the legislature's interest in "equitable
allocation" is not matched by an interest in the question of
whether to build highways at all. To the extent that state statutes
is to determine
say anything about how the highway department
75
road requirements, the provisions are vacuous.
The state highway departments, of course, have procedures
for determining highway needs. The American Association of
State Highway Officials (AASHO) publishes uniform standards
for roads, including their carrying capacity. By agreement state
officials submit needs reports to the Federal Highway Administrator using the AASHO standards. For the 1972 Highway
Needs Report, the highway departments included as a "need"
road improvements sufficient to move all projected traffic
during the period 1970-1989 at a minimum speed of 35-40 miles
per hour. 76 The total bill for achieving this goal would be 592
billion dollars.77
It is perhaps not unrealistic to suggest that the delegation of
highway need determinations to the state political process is the
most significant aspect of the federal-aid highway statutes. This
standardless delegation sets the dominant tone for the administration of the program and leaves without guiding principle
the major question in every conflict about highway building: Is
this highway needed?
The National Highway Needs Reports which are required to be
submitted to Congress every 2 years (by the States) use quite a different
concept of "need" than that which I have outlined above. "Need" as used in
these reports refers to "capacity adequate to accommodate the highway
travel forecast for a given target year."-1970 National Highway Needs
Report, p. 11 -Since funds are apportioned to the States in accordance with
their estimated "needs," the financing system contains a considerable
incentive to produce travel forecasts.
Hearings on Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1970 Be ore the Subcommn on Roads of the Senate
Comm
75 on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 227 1970).
76

Seetext accompanying notes 110-21 infra.

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 1972 NATIONAL HIGHWAY NEEDS REPORT, pt. 1,

at 10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 HIGHWAY NEEDS REPORT].

77$302 billion for arterials; $107 billion for collector routes; $183 billion for local
systems. Id. 11.
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2. Local Control
One of the points of obvious conflict concerning highway
needs is that between local preferences and the requirements of a
state or regional highway system. Local citizens and public
officials can be expected to complain when their community is
cut off of a main trade route in the interests of faster interstate
travel or when their elm trees and architecture are obliterated in
the interests of intercity through traffic. Whether cutting
through the locality or bypassing it, state highway officials are
likely to have a different perspective than the locals. As we have
previously noted,7 8 the federal legislation attempts to recognize
the legitimacy of both these perspectives. But what should the
Federal Highway Administration's posture be in the face of
claims that local needs or desires are being neglected by the state
officials seeking federal funding? It is supposed to approve
projects which satisfy both local and national transportation
needs,79 but that is to say nothing about how a compromise is to
be struck when these purposes conflict.
The signals that the FHWA gets from the federal-aid
highway legislation and from other statutory sources suggest that
conflicts should be ironed out at the state-local level. Under
section 134(a) of title 23,80 the Secretary is not to approve
projects in SMSA's unless "based on" a "comprehensive
transportation planning process" which is carried on
cooperatively through policy committees having both state and
local representation. Under this requirement the FHWA has
assumed responsibility for determining both that the minimal
elements of a "planning process" exist 8 1 and that there is
meaningful involvement of both states and localities.8 2 But the
federal agency has not undertaken to assure that local interests
will have a fair shot at preference in cases of conflict. The
78

Seetext accompanying notes 30-36 supra
7923 U.S.C. §§ 105, 109 (1970).
1d § 134(a). Plans and priorities are officially adopted and modified by committees
composed of state highway officials and elected officials from affected political
subdivisions, operating under the terms of written agreements between the state and the
locality.
PPM 50-9, supra note 33,
4d.
81
PPM 50-9, supra note 33,
5, breaks down the transportation planning process
into ten elements, each of which FHWA must find to be present in the locality before
granting its annual certification in SMSA's, a prerequisite to approval of the state's
highway construction program. FHWA Instructional Memorandum 50-3-71 (Apr. 13,
1971).
82
PPM 50-9, supra note 33,
4d, defines "cooperatively" in some detail. It also
specifies that "the State highway department will be expected to show by suitable
evidence that scrupulous efforts have been made to carry out the intent of the Act with
respect to cooperative action by all political subdivisions." Presumably this showing must
accompany the state's annual application for certification of its planning process.
80
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FHWA's justification for its position is that the statute requires,
not a "plan," but only a "planning process," and also that it
requires only that the project be "based on" that planning
process. There is, after all, opportunity for local citizens and
officials to be heard, either when the project is presented to local
officials via the BOB A-95 review procedure, or at general
public hearings, should they be dissatisfied with the product of
the state-local highway planning process.
The FHWA position is often an unhappy one for persons
opposing a federal-aid project, for in many of the highway
controversies around the country one finds that the opponents of
a particular highway project are a group of local citizens who
are, in effect, saying that the local officials have not protected
local values and interests. The familiar lament is that the
highway department has all the money and all the expertise: the
city planners and officials either are their colleagues, or are at
their mercy, or, God forbid, agree with them. Hence, while there
may have been some infusion of professional planning and
nontransportation community values, the .game is still power
politics at the local level, and the complainants are the losers. But
this merely states the complainants' problem. It does not justify
an FHWA program for the reform of local government.
And even should there be official objections on behalf of
local interests, how is the FHWA to deal with local and state
conflicts? By refusing to provide funds until a compromise
position is achieved? This is a neutral (and frequently used)
technique. But what if the state position is sensible, and the
highway department has authority under state law to construct
the project? The multijurisdictional effects of highway construction virtually require that final authority rest with the state. Final
authority in affected localities to block a highway project
through their territory on environmental or social grounds
would imply also allowing localities to prevent their being
bypassed by a project just outside their boundaries on economic
grounds. And if the prospect of giving localities final authority is
not consistently appealing, surely that authority should be given
to the state highway department, which is directly accountable to
the state legislature for its stewardship of the state highway
program and which is required to consult localities and to certify
that it has considered the overall environmental, social and
economic effects of the project. It is hardly surprising then that
federal administrators tend to accept the state highway department as the final arbiter in this decision process.
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3.

Environmental, Economic and
Social Considerations

The recognition of the primacy of the state department's
choice is strengthened by the realization that considering
economic, social and environmental effects of a highway project
is clearly made a state responsibility, subject only to certification
that the consideration has been undertaken. To be sure, FHWA
has spelled out by regulation the sorts of questions which should
be considered under these statutory labels, and the state is
required to articulate its consideration of these factors in
response to submissions made at the public hearing. But one
certainly has no inkling from this requirement that Tuesdayevening planners should be permitted to actuate an exhaustive
study by the highway department of any econonic, social or
enviornmental problem that they care to raise at a public
hearing. Unless "consideration" can include a commonsense
judgment that the problem is not sufficiently weighty to cause a
change in plans or that a scientific inquiry into the particular
effect in question is too costly or too speculative, highway
building is at an end. Hence, complaints to FHWA that the
highway department has failed to consider adequately something of peculiar value to the complainant will often produce
little satisfaction. Again, the primary responsibility is the state
department's and is to be exercised within the framework of the
overall purpose of the program: building highways.
4. Citizen Participation
Nor is the public hearing requirement a significant limitation on the highway department's discretionary authority. The
department has the responsibility of deciding contrary to the
unanimous wishes of all hearing participants if in its view the
"longrun public interest" will thereby be served.83 Since public
hearings rarely cast any light on issues other than the current
consensus among those attending the hearing, highway departments are perhaps realistic to treat them largely as means for
taking the political temperature of the locality and for selling the
department's viewpoint.
In sum, there is really very little in the federal-aid highway
legislation for the FHWA to enforce other than procedural
regularity. The Congress has had something to say about local
83

Cf 23 C.F.R. § 790.1(c) (2) (1973).
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preferences, environmental and social considerations, and public
participation. But the crucial question, "to build or not to build,"
is one of preference and power. The Federal-Aid Highways Acts
largely reinforce the power of state legislatures and highway
departments to act on their preferences. In this context, the
FHWA's posture of senior partner in a common enterprise,
rather than federal policeman or auditor, seems quite appropriate.
C.

The Citizen's Lament

The introduction of limited and largely procedural "socialization" criteria into highway planning can give rise to false
hopes and intense frustrations. The mere existence of legislative
requirements dealing with the consideration of local needs, with
"comprehensive planning," with the consideration of environmental and social factors or with public hearings, is sometimes
taken as evidence of a revolutionary congressional reorientation
of the highway program. These requirements are viewed, or are
sought to be viewed, as shifting the federal-aid program away
from its traditional concern with vehicular transportation and
toward goals such as renewing the urban environment, abating
pollution and reinforcing a sense of community and of local
control over local affairs. The citizen who approaches any
highway project with this set of attitudes is headed for
disaffection with the administrative process. Indeed, should he
approach the administrative process with no preconceptions
concerning federal law and policy, he is nevertheless likely to
come away convinced that the process is undemocratic,
irrational and designed only to facilitate the building of
highways.
1. Public Hearings
The citizen often gets his first impressions of the highway
department at public hearings. It is not likely to be a good one. If
you add to all the usual difficulties of gauging public sentiment
from public hearings84 the additional problem in highway public
84
See generally Symposium on the Public Hearing,21 AD. L. REv. 119 (1969). A study of
public hearings held in Virginia between May 26 andJuly 15, 1970, revealed that 81% of
the participants were "white collar professional or managerial." R. Saroff & E. Walton, A
Profile of Citizens Attending Public Hearings 7 (undated unpublished manuscript).
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hearings that many people are there for the almost irrelevant
purpose of talking about whether a road is needed,8 5 the highway
department immediately appears to be a villain. In highway
planning terms -insufficiency
of the existing roadway for
present and future traffic-need has already been determined.
The major purpose of the public hearings is the discussion of
location and design alternatives within a predetermined corridor. 8 7 Although the discussion of location and design questions
is not an insignificant purpose, it is difficult for the highway
department to get the public hearing participants to concentrate
on those subjects. The participants may even have the bad grace
to suggest that if the only alternative acceptable to them-no
road-is not a live option, then the hearing is an exercise in
futility.
In addition to this complaint the citizen who attends a public
hearing on a highway is likely to think that the highway
department has a monopoly on information and fails to take him
seriously. 88 Even taking a location hearing at its best, the
highway department is so far along in its evaluation of sites based
on its travel demand estimates and preliminary engineering
studies that the private individual can hardly compete."3 When
he does complain or even offer data at the hearing, he often
receives no further communication from the highway department. His testimony is entered in the record and the department
makes a decision. Whether the views expressed by the citizen
85

1f one may draw conclusions from an eclectic survey of hearing transcripts in
which other than purely informational questions were asked, this purpose seems as likely
to be shared by professional planning consultants in urban areas as by lay participants in
Deep Creek, Virginia.
86The FHWA hearings regulations suggest that the "need" for the highway is
properly a subject of hearings at the location phase. "A 'corridor public hearing' is a
public hearing that ... [ils
held to ensure that an opportunity is afforded for effective
participation by interested persons in the process of determining the need for, and the
location of, a Federal-aid highway . . ." 23 C.F.R. § 790.3(a)(2) (1973) (emphasis
added). But by the time a proposed route reaches the location phase, it has already been
put on a federal-aid system and has been included in the construction program submitted
by the state. Seetext accompanying notes 63-67 supra. If the road passes through an urban
area, 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970), or if it is a secondary road, id § 105(b), it will also have
been approved by local officials. Thus, although the need for it might be disputed, the
determination that it should be built has already been made by planners and politicians
alike.8 7
See23 C.F.R. § 790.3 (a)-(b) (1973).
88

See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See alsoR. Saroff & E.

Walton, A Strategy for Highway Hearings (1971) (unpublished manuscript prepared for
the Virginia Highway Research Board).
89
The ubiquity of this phenomenon in public hearings of all sorts has given rise to the
so-called "advocate planner." See, e.g., Davidoff, The Planner as Advocate, in URBAN
GOVERNMENT: A READER INADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS (E. Banfield ed. 1969).
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have any impact on the ultimate decision will remain a mystery
to him unless he pursues informal avenues of access to the
department 'J° after the hearing. The citizen participant in public
hearings is hardly reassured by the failure of most departments
to make any mention at the hearing of the "economic, social and
environmental" factors they have considered or, for that matter,
to set forth any formal rationale for the project. The department
is there to inform the public of its plans and to hear from them. It
is under no obligation to make an affirmative case or to subject its
project rationale to cross-examination.
It seems fair to conclude that highway public hearings
probably do not inspire confidence in the openness or rationality
of the highway decision process. Perhaps because the hearing
seems only an offcenter peephole into the backrooms of highway
politics, highway opponents have begun to use hearings as focal
points for political activity of their own.
2.

Local Planning

The citizen of an urban area may discover for the first time
at the highway department's public hearing that the project to
which he objects has been approved by his local elected
officials 9 ' -often on the recommendation of the local planning
commission. In light of this fact, he can hardly accuse the
highway department of unresponsiveness to local needs and of
failure to consider local planning. Perhaps his efforts should be
directed toward understanding and influencing local transportation planning. This may indeed be a sound strategy, but a look at
what local transportation planning has accomplished, other than
the building of additional roads, will not encourage him. Our
hypothetical citizen is very likely to find that the efforts of his
local planning agency are of dubious quality and that the state
highway department is intimately involved in those efforts.
The ineffectiveness of city planners in this area has its roots
in history. The initiation of trust fund financing for the federalaid highways program and the "take-off" of the interstate
program caught the planning profession unprepared. Even in
9
( This is not to say that the hearing comments are ignored. The highway officials
with whom this writer has had any contact firmly believe that they are responsive to any
"good" or "high quality" comments made at hearings, and FHWA regulations do
require that the highway department's requests for location or design approval contain a
"summary and analysis" of the views it has obtained on the project. 23 C.F.R. §
790.9(b)(3) (1973).
91
See note 80 supra & accompanying text.
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the largest metropolitan areas the planners had little idea
whether they wanted the roads that were to be made available to
them. Answering that question required a comprehension of the
goals of the community, the relationship of the physical structure
of urban space to those goals, and the impact of street
transportation on the configuration of the urban space. The
planning profession was only beginning to come to grips with the
first two issues; 92 the transition from "city engineer" to "city
planner" was in its infancy.
Moreover, the planner had to and indeed still must contend
with the strong laissez-faire tradition in land use in the United
States. In order to carve out a position for himself in city
government, the planner has been required to move into a
"detached" position and to keep his fences well mended with the
middle-class coalition which forms his political base. The result
has been planning which emphasizes the technical skills of the
planning office and minimizes disputes concerning basic community values. In the words of one historian of planning,
"conservation, caution and reluctance to act are the chief
93
characteristics of most planning agencies."
The impact of the city planner's unfortunate posture on his
effectiveness in transportation planning was predictable. Because
he could develop no well-defined community goals as a basis for
independent evaluation of street transportation plans, he was
forced to float with the political sea around him. Because he was
a "city," not a "transportation," and certainly not a "highway"
planner, he could not capture significant power through the
application of technical expertise.
A passage from DOT's Transportation Planning Manual
suggests what happened when local planners failed to seize the
initiative in the context of a well-funded public works program
with a specific aim.
In some areas, regional development goals do not exist
explicitly or do not seem currently useful for transportation planning. In most cases they are not detailed
enough to satisfy the needs of transportation planning.
Therefore, it is usually the duty of the transportation
planning staff to arrive at useful
statements and to
94
obtain policy approval of these.
92

M. SCOTr,AMERICAI CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 536-41 (1969).
93S. MAKIELSKI, LOCAL PLANNING IN VIRGINIA 101 (1969).
94
U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Transportation Planning Manual (undated manuscript segment in author's files).
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Elsewhere the Planning Manual suggests the contents of such
"statements" in revealing detail: "Goal: to provide efficient,
economical transportation; Objective: Minimize ' congestion;
95
Evaluative Criterion: Travel volume in peak period.
These instructions, of course, are directed to those to whom
the planning of highway facilities has gravitated-the state
highway departments and' private consultants specializing in
highway projects. Only the largest cities have truly independent
transportation planning capacity. 96 The rest rely on what the
state highway departments, under the federal-aid arrangement,
have consistently been able to offer: either money for a
consultant to draw up a plan for local officials, or the technical
resources to do the planning within the state agency. 97 In many
cases even the original impetus for developing a local transportation plan may come from the state highway department, which
recognizes the need for a 9planning
process which will satisfy
8
federal grant requirements.
The initial approach of the transportation planner is to make
an origin-destination survey which tells him where people are
and where they want to go. This information is then used in
conjunction with information on vehicle registration, population
and economic growth and existing and predicted land use to
determine how traffic is likely to be generated and distributed
over the existing transportation network. If areas of congestion
show up, facilities are suggested, within predicted resource
constraints, to relieve the congestion by siphoning off some of
the traffic. The report then becomes the official transportation
t-5 Id
96
Netherton, supra note 10, at 22-23; Hearings on Urban Highway Planning,Location,
and Design Before Subcomm on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess.,Pt. 1, at 123, 126 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Urban Highway Hearings].
An intensive study of planning in Charlottesville, Virginia, for example, revealed
that the city's transportation planning process was almost completely controlled by the
Virginia Department of Highways and that the state-local relationship was similar
throughout the state. J. Natalie, Charlottesville Planning History (undated unpublished
manuscript in author's files).
That the state highway department has not lost control is evidenced by the terms of
An Agreement for a Continuing Comprehensive TransportationPlanningProcessfor the Richmond
Region Between the Virginia Department of Highways and the Richmond Regional Planning
Commission Executed in 1970, the agreement provides that "[tihe general supervision of
any . . .adjustment of location and design of highways for Transportation Plan reevaluation will be under the Department ... " The permanency of this arrangement is
indicated by a provision for termination "only when: (1) Section 9 of the 1962 Federal
Highway Act ... is repealed or amended . . .to no longer require the continuing,
comprehensive and cooperative transportation planning process."
98Seenote 81 supra.
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plan for99 the community when adopted by the appropriate
officials.

This is, of course, a highly simplified model of the
transportation planning process, but run-of-the-mill transporta00
tion planning is not significantly more sophisticated than this.1
And, of course, the process usually results in the proposal of
additional roads. This is partly due to factors I have just
explored: the dominant role of the state highway department in
planning and the absence of well-developed community goals,
other than reducing congestion, to be fed into the plan. 01 A
further explanation is that most of the available resources for
transportation facilities are available only for road building
purposes. Finally, trends which appear from data on land use
and on choice of travel mode, and which are used as a basis for
transportation planning, are reflections in part of a continuing
investment in road transport.1 0 2 There is widespread theoretical
agreement, in fact, that the recommendations of planners
employing the accepted methodology are self-fulfilling prophecies, because the effects of highways on land use will eventually
10 3
substantiate the projected need.

It is possible, of course, that irate citizens will appear at local
hearings on a new transportation plan which proposes additional
streets and thoroughfares. But they are likely to be viewed as
soreheads who place their private interests above the demonstrated need of the public for expanded facilities. They have no
systematic approach to the development of the city to place
against the seemingly inexorable predictions of the transportation planner. Indeed, should the planning commission or city
council want to make changes in the plan, even they may meet
objections from the highway department of the general form:
"We must fund facilities which meet expected travel demands. If
you want to delete projects for which our studies show a need, we
will have to restudy the whole transportation system. We cannot
get to that for three to five years. Meanwhile, we would have to
99
See Creighton, TransportationPlanning,in LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 189,
215-19 ( McLean ed. 1959).
l00See generally R. CREIGHTON, URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING (1970); R.
ZETTEL & R. CARLL, SUMMARY REVIEW OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORTATION STUDIES INTHE U.S.( 1962).
101 UrbanHighway Hearings,supranote95, at 453,456.
102See Hearings on Economic Analysis and Efficiency in Government Before the J7oint

Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1045 (1970) (statement by Assistant
Secretary of Transportation Baker) [hereinafter cited as Efficiency in Government.
3
I 0 SeeTECHNIQUES OFTRANSPORT PLANNING 108-09 (J. Meyer ed. 1971).
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suspend funding of any projects in your area." Rare is the mayor
who does not want something significant from the highway
department or who has a sufficiently aroused citizenry to risk the
consequences of a loss of all funding.
When there is no city involved, there is likely to be no
counterweight at all to the state highway department. Planning
commissions in rural areas are rare and, if they exist, are
generally weaker than their city counterparts. The citizenry is
dispersed and unorganized. The only comments on a proposed
highway project in a rural area are likely to come from other
state agencies: the Department of Natural Resources, for
example, or a Fish and Wildlife Commission.
The rejection by the Congress in 19621"4 of language which
would have required that all road projects be "consistent" with
urban planning and part of a "soundly based, balanced urban
transportation system" in favor of the existing requirement that
the project be "based on" a "continuing, comprehensive
transportation planning process" is significant in this context. It
reflects both the disarray of the urban planneri °'5 (who may have
a "planning process" without ever producing a "plan") and the
intricate balance of power between state highway departments
and local officials. The balance has not been upset.'0 6 And, to the
14S. 3136, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), would have amended the highway code to
provide that all approved projects be "consistent with adequate comprehensive
development plans" and that "the federal-aid system so developed be an integral part of a
soundly based, balanced transportation system .... This language was rejected in favor
of a comprehensive planning provision which omitted the requirement of consistency
with a plan and the criterion of a "soundly based balanced transportation system." H.R.
12135, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The Senate Committee on Public Works articulated
the basis for its acceptance of the House version in these terms: "The Committee
recognizes that transportation planning is almost invariably a continuing process; hence,
this section has been drawn in such a way as to make it clear that a completed
comprehensive plan, as such, is not necessary to meet its requirements." S. REP. No.
1997, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962).
In Senate hearings on urban highways in 1968, several witnesses lamented the
narrow focus of § 134 and the difficulty of producing truly comprehensive transportation
planning under restrictions on the use of federal planning funds for highway planning
only. See, e.g., Urban Highway Hearings, supra note 96, at 93 (testimony of Arthur Palmer,
Transportation Administrator for New York City); cf id. 16 (testimony of William
Slayton, Executive Vice-President, Urban America, Inc.).
0
' 5Robert Moses informed the House Committee on Public Works in 1962 that the
requirement of a comprehensive plan would bring highway building in New York to a
standstill, perhaps for a decade. Hearingson the Federal-AidHighways Act of 1962 Before the
Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on Public Works, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1962). And
in 1964, the Federal Highway Administrator testified that only 100 of 219 urban areas
subject to § 134 were geared up to meet the continuous, cooperative and comprehensive
planning requirements of that section. Hearings on the Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1964
Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm on Public Works, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 35
(1964).
'Ol'he technique by which FHWA obtained state-local cooperation was to require a
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citizen attempting to challenge the highway builders' conclusions, the local "planning process" and the federal requirements
which support it appear to be little more than a sham.
IV. HIGHWAY LITIGATION
A volatile mixture has resulted from the combination of:
intense and conflicting interests among the affected public
concerning the desirability of building roads in general or of
constructing specific road projects in particular; apparent
legislative efforts to reorient the federal-aid highway program
which are blunted in their administration; loss of faith in local
planners and public officials; a disenchantment with highway
departments, in part engendered by the departments' own public
hearings; a general increase in environmental and social
consciousness; and an increasing belief in and ability to use
litigation for the ventilation of issues of public choice. It is a
mixture that has been exploding in the faces of state highway
commissioners in courts all over the country and which has made
the Secretary of Transportation one of the most sought-after
defendants in the land.
This litigation has been of value in alerting many to the
frustration and conflict which inhere in processes of public
decisionmaking about highways. But whether judicial resolution
of specific disputes should also be a means of "reforming" the
decision process to alleviate these problems is quite another
question. One thing seems reasonably clear: highway litigation
will be difficult to defend on the general ground which may be
offered in support of many environmental lawsuits, that is, as a
least-cost method of establishing lines of communication or
assembling parties to permit bargaining. 10 7 Litigation between
highway officials and parties who challenge the legality of their
decisions simply provides a new context and usually a new focus
for disputes which have been going on elsewhere. The process
for making decisions about highway construction that has been
described above has many points at which views may be made
memorandum of agreement between state highway departments and local governing
bodies. See note 80 supra. These agreements were similar in structure and in their
substantive provisions and reflected FHWA's belief that municipalities were not
generally competent to do transportation planning. See Urban Highway Hearings, supra
note 96, at 539 (statement of Lowell K. Bridwell).
07
Cf Note, The Cost-InternalizationCase for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REv. 383
(1969).
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known and pressure may be applied by those harboring
antihighway sentiments. The public hearing provisions of the
highway legislation and of most planning commission charters
provide focal points for the assembling of all variations of public
and official opinion. Because highway planning is essentially a
political process, local representatives to both state and federal
legislatures can and do provide access to state and federal
administrators for discussions and negotiations outside the
hearing context. Indeed, access to the highway administrator is
seldom a problem for the citizen who fails to solicit an official
introduction-he just talks to a lower level administrator.
Hence the social function of highway litigation is likely to
consist of the usual mundane but necessary tasks of judicial
review of administrative action: authoritative dispute resolution
and the assurance of conformity with the statutory scheme under
which the administrator operates. Yet there is always some
potential for "reform" of the public decision process through the
medium of judicial review. One such possibility is that the
judiciary might come to interpret the statutory requirements for
adequate administrative decisionmaking in ways which differ
markedly from historical administrative practice. This potential
for reform has been realized to some degree in judicial review of
administrative decisions concerning highway building. We turn,
then, to a review and evaluation of these reforms and how they
have been effected. The general conclusions which emerge are
that judicial review is not a very productive means of reforming
the highway decision process and that the reforms produced may
be* of questionable value save to those interested in strategic
shifts in the balance of power between highway builders and
their opponents.
A.

State JudicialReview

Attempts to secure state judicial review of highway planning
decisions have been, at least in the short run, overwhelmingly
unproductive. Several factors explain this result, but underlying
them all is the judicial notion that the "legislature has placed in
the [highway] commission discretion, authority and power [in
regard to design and location of public highways]. Courts may
interfere only when there is abuse of the power so granted or
10 8
when there is attempted action beyond the grant of power."'
10 8A & S, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1377, 1385, 116 N.W.2d
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Indeed, some courts view the planning process as so legislative in
nature that "at least in the absence of statutory provisions, the
determination of the necessity or advisability of locating and
constructing highways is exclusively in the power of the tribunal
created for such purpose by the legislature and the courts have
no jurisdiction in such matters."'' Whichever view is adopted,
the result is essentially the same: state highway administrative
decisions are final and free from judicial interference.
The courts are not to be faulted for taking a restrictive view
of their role in the highway planning process. Save where
legislatures specifically designate routes themselves, a highway
statute commonly gives highway agencies virtually standardless
discretion to establish highway systems. " " Although highway
legislation varies significantly among the states, there is a pattern
which generally characterizes its structure. Typically, the
legislation establishes: the powers and responsibilities of the state
highway department; the relationship between state and local
jurisdictions in constructing and maintaining highway facilities;
methods for allocating funds among the different areas of the
state; and the definition or description of various state road
systems. More important for the private litigant, however, is the
common absence of provisions establishing standards by which
to gauge the necessity for or the location of a given road."'
Provisions which explicitly require consideration of social,
economic or environmental factors, or which require coordination of state highways with local comprehensive planning,
seldom appear in the state legislation. These concerns may be
implicit in provisions making the consent and perhaps the
financial participation of localities prerequisites to construction
496, 501 (1962); accord, Saint Clair County v. Town of Riverside, 272 Ala. 294, 128 So.
2d 333 (1961); State Highway Dep't v. MacDonald, 221 Ga. 312, 144 S.E.2d 363 (1965).
109
Town of Clearmont v. State Highway Comm'n, 357 P.fiD ffffi°, ffffi] (Wyo. 1960);
accord, Evans v. Edelbrock, 106 Kan. 233, 187 P. 664 (1920).
110Occasionally the county court may exercise this political function with respect to
local roads. E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 23, § 43 (1958) (courts of county commissioners have
general superintendance of public roads); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 163.13 (1960) (appeal of

right to county court).
"'E.g.,
The highway authorities of the state, counties, cities, towns, and villages,
acting alone or in cooperation with each other... are hereby authorized to
plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and
provide access facilities for public use wherever such authority or
authorities are of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will
justify such special facilities ...
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 24-72 (1967).
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of highway projects," ' or demanding the justification of
proposed road improvements in terms of adequacy of service
and vehicle load; 113 but without express provision of more
stringent requirements, judicial review is largely a formality.
Even in those states in which specific need criteria are
delineated, the provisions may be of little use to the plaintiff. The
statutes are sometimes concerned only with the protection of
localities, or they may apply only when roads are relocated,
replaced or abandoned.14judicial review even at the instance of
local governing bodies may be precluded."I' And the standards
typically are so vague that virtually no administrative action
under them could be classified as "arbitrary and.., an abuse of
discretion""" or a misuse of legislative power under the usual
review standard." 17 The state highway department's actions are
found to constitute an abuse of discretion only in that rare
eminent domain proceeding in which arbitrariness is directed
towards one property owner 118 or where the highway commission runs afoul of a nonhighway statute. 1 9
Statutorily prescribed procedures for state highway decisionmaking are also generally very limited; they offer little to
the plaintiff searching for irregularities upon which to base a
112E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-60 (1964) (county commissioners must consent to
abandonment or material alteration of roads in county system).
" Eg., N.Y. H'WAYLAW§ 220(4) (McKinney 1962).
I"E.g., IDAHO CODE § 40-121 (1961). But se? CAL. STS.& H'WAYS CODE § 75.7 (West
Supp. 1973), which specifies 13 factors which the state highway commission must
expressly consider in a highway location report. Though the provision doubtless gives
more guidance than most state statutes do, its failure to delineate the weight to be given
to each factor suggests that the commission's report may serve as little more than a
recording document.
I15E.g., N.C. GEN.STAT.§ 136-59 (Supp. 1971).
" 6Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. State Highway Dep't, 224 Ga. 344, 346, 161
S.E.2d7 859, 861 (1968).
"1 See, e.g., Brown v. McMorran, 23 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 257 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77
(1965).
'l 8 The "public purpose" concept is so broad that virtually any taking for highway
urposes is permissible. See, e.g., Washington Park, Inc. Appeal, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1
1967). But see Maher v. Lasater, 163 Tex. 3,56, 354 S.W.2d 923 (1962). The "public
purpose" test may not be met with respect to the taking of a particular piece of property
for a concededly "public" highway, e.g., Brest v.Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 194 So.
2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'dpercurian, 202 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967), but that has little
impact on the project. The question raised is the necessity for taking the particular
property, not the necessity for the highway.
State administrative procedure acts following the model act, REVISED MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 15 (1970), treat highway planning decisions as
unreviewable, and specific statutory review provisions are generally limited to issues that
are irrelevant or peripheral to highway need and location decisions. E.g., WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 47.32.060, 47.42.060, 47.52.195 (1970). Injunction suits are the major
vehicle for review apart from the occasional quixotic eminent domain contest.
',Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967).
.
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claim for judicial relief. In most states, the only procedure of any
importance is the public hearing, and this typically is required
only in special situations, such as when a highway is vacated. 20
Attempts to read these procedures expansively, as requiring, for
example, that the officials who make actual planifing
decisions
21
attend the hearings, have not been successful.1
The only real hope of the state-court plaintiff is the
application of federal grant standards to channel and confine the
state highway department's discretion. But whenever the
question of the applicability of federal standards has been
confronted, 122 the federal conditions have been considered
inapplicable. Contrary to the developing trend toward utilization of federal standards as a basis for judicial review of the
operations of grantees in fields like public housing and public
assistance, the approach under the Federal-Aid Highways Acts
has been that federal standards are conditions on funding and
relevant only to a grant decision by FHWA. 123 Occasionally state
statutes will require compliance with federal highway standards,' 24 but even then the court may take the FHWA approval
of the project as conclusive evidence of the satisfaction of these
requirements.1*
B.

FederalJudicialReview

1. The Party Defendant
The grant-in-aid nature of the federal highway program
causes some substantial difficulties for the opponent of cooperative state and federal highway construction. His desire is to use
the requirements of the Federal-Aid Highways Acts when
complaining of highway construction by a state highway
department. But the federal criteria are directions to the
Secretary of Transportation. As a condition of federal participa0
12
121E.g., IOWA CODEANN. § 306.11-13 (Supp. 1972).
See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1115, 152 N.W.2d
248 (1967).
122The issue is occasionally skirted by a finding of conformity in fact with the federal
law. See, e.g., Piekarski v. Smith, 37 Del. Ch. 594, 153 A.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Town of
Clearmont
v. State Highway Comm'n, 357 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1960).
123 piekarski v. Smith, 37 Del. Ch.594, 153 A.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1958); MorningsideLenox Park Ass'n v. State Highway Dep't, 224 Ga. 344, 161 S.E.2d 859 (1968);
Linnecke v. Department of Highways, 348 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1960); Futch v. Greer, 353
S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
1245 E.g., N.Y. H'wAy LAW § 85 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
2-SeeTown of Clearmont v. State Highway Comm'n, 357 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1960).
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tion in the financing of a road, they require him to make certain
determinations, such as that the facility serves both local and
federal highway system needs;' 26 or to receive certifications from
state officials, such as that public hearings have been held and
that the social, economic and environmental effects of the
proposed project have been considered.1 27 Accordingly, the
courts have generally held that the federal statute creates no
28
cause of action against state highway departments.1
This almost cavalier determination that persons adversely
affected by alleged violations of federal law have no federal
cause of action based on the highway statutes is likely to be
troubling to those familiar with federal securities regulation and
the ubiquitous rule I Ob-51 29 action or, more pertinently, with the
130
deluge of lawsuits based on Title IV of the Social Security Act
brought against state welfare departments in the wake of King v.
Smith.' 31 Of course, highway cases may be different. In the
securities field the statutes and regulations protect a specified
class of persons against certain proscribed conduct which is
peculiarly injurious to their interests. The highway provisions
are largely procedural rather than proscriptive; they protect the
public generally and are enunciated in the context of a
cooperative public works program of a sort traditionally outside
the ambit of the private civil action or even a review proceeding.
While the categorical public assistance programs are also grantin-aid programs, welfare plaintiffs are individually affected by
12623 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1970).

127Id § 128 (1970).
128See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F: Supp. 809, 812
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert denied 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Road
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
These decisions have been rendered in the context of claims by the state department,
the state highway commissioner, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
supra, at 810-11, or state contractors, e.g., Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass.
1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 625 (3d Cir.
1971), that they are immune from suit in federal court by the citizens of that or another
state. See generally U.S. Const. amend. XI; Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)
(involving a suit brought by former employees of a state-operated railroad for damages
covering personal injuries sustained while employed: the Supreme Court rejected the
state's claim of sovereign immunity). The existence or nonexistence of a federal cause of
action based on the Federal-Aid Highways Acts was critical to the evaluation of the
claimed defense, because a waiver of immunity might be found should the state be
determined to have accepted participation in a program creating a federal cause of action
for specific classes of persons. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra,at
812-13; cf Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, supra, at 625.
12917 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
'3042 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970).
13'392 U.S. 309 (1968). See generally Note, Federaljurisdiction Over Challenges to State
Welfare Prograns,72 COLUM.L. REV. 1404 (1972).
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the failure of state governments to abide by the protective
conditions of the Social Security Act. This brings them within
the ambit of section 1983,132 which provides a federal cause of

action for any person deprived of any "right, privilege or
immunity" guaranteed by federal law. 3 3 Only in certain
situations which are not particularly germane to this study, for
example, improper provision of relocation assistance, would a
similarly
specific claim accrue to the complainant in a highway
34
case.

1

These distinctions are less than completely satisfying
because the criteria are rather vague for determining whether
federal statutes should be held to imply federal causes of action
or whether claims should be included within the general scope of
section 1983. Indeed, one is tempted to conclude that the law on
13 5
these questions is in some considerable theoretical disarray.
Nor is the problem less dense if one eschews "cause of action"
language and casts the question in terms of whether the statute
entitles the plaintiff to obtain federal court "review" of the state
department's actions. In the absence of a specific provision for
review we have no theory of review of administrative action
which is not based on either a unitary system of government (the
prerogative writ system) or a claim analogous to a claim of
private civil wrong. Neither basis can be used under these
circumstances. Here the plaintiffs would be asking a federalcourt
to "review" the actions of a state administrator. And the recent
and happy divorce of "standing" to review federal agency action
from the necessity of showing a "legal right,"' 136 precludes the

glib assertion that if the plaintiff has standing to seek to enjoin
13242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
133Id The provision requires that the right be threatened by one acting under color
of state law: policemen, government inspectors, commissioners and other administrators.
A similar cause of action based on the deprivation of fourth amendment rights has been
allowed against federal officers where other remedies were considered inadequate. Bivens
v. Six134Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
1n only 1 highway case has § 1983 been the basis for suit. The7 claim was
appropriately so cast because the main complaint concerned racial discrimination.
Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 921 (1968). La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972), seems to be a similar case although the rejection of
defendants'
sovereign immunity claim is cast quite broadly.
135
See generally F. HARPER & F.JANEsTHELAW OFToRTS § 17.5-17.6 (1956); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OFTORTS 190-204 (4th ed. 1971); Katz, The JurisprudenceofRemedies:
ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968);
Morris, The Role of CriminalStatutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1949);
Note, Limiting the § 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486
(1969).
136 See, eg., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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federal funding because of a state's failure to conform to federal
statutory standards, he must have a "right" to state compliance
which can be pursued against the state via section 1983.
Although pursuit of these questions must await another day,
they are of more than theoretical concern for the highway
litigant. The dismissal of the state highway department from the
litigation 137 creates a series of practical problems. Not the least of
these is the realization that complete success results only in the
exclusion of federal funding from the project. Should the state
decide to proceed with its own funds, the victory is hollow. This
prospect is particularly likely in those states whose annual roadbuilding expenditure on roads qualified for inclusion within a
federal-aid system exceeds the annual allotment to the state from
federal revenues. In these states federal money lost on one
project can be shifted to another which was being funded wholly
from the state's own coffers, and vice versa. The switch is
virtually costless.
The spectre of this sort of shell game became too much for

Judge Thornberry in Named IndividualMembers of the San Antonio
Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department.138 To summarize a long and complex history of litigation, the plaintiffs in that
case were seeking to enjoin federal funding of two disconnected
segments of highway known as the North Expressway Project.
These segments would, when constructed, abut the north and
south ends respectively of Breckinridge Park in San Antonio.39
Plaintiffs claimed that federal funding was improper because the
Secretary of Transportation had not found in accordance with
section 138 of title 23 that there was no feasible or prudent
alternative to taking land from Breckinridge Park. The Secretary and the Texas State Highway Department defended on the
almost shameless ground that no parkland was being taken and
that therefore no section 138 determination was required. Of
course, once the expressway was built up to both sides of the
park there would hardly be a feasible or prudent alternative to
the taking of parkland for the connecting link, and the court
quite appropriately refused to allow "segmenting" of the
137The federal court may occasionally issue an order against the state where
necessary to preserve its power to provide an effective remedy against the federal
government. Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1000 (1972).
138446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
1391d
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expressway into three projects in order to sidestep any
significant application of the section 138 requirement.
However, the Texas Highway Department was committed
to the North Expressway project, federal funds or no, and having
not yet received any federal monies, it renounced all intention of
applying for or accepting any such funds in aid of its project. The
Highway Department then claimed that in this posture it was not
bound by federal requirements and could not be enjoined from
proceeding. Not so, concluded Judge Thornberry, and he
enjoined further construction until the Secretary of Transportation complied with section 138 and NEPA. In the court's view:
"The North Expressway is now a federal project, and it has been
a federal project since the Secretary of Transportation
authorized federal participation in the project ....140
Clearly state highway departments should not be allowed to
accept federal money for highway projects while avoiding
compliance with any federal requirements which appear troublesome by segmenting the project into state and federal portions. 4 '
But this was not really the Texas Highway Department's
proposal. It was prepared to exclude federal funding from all
portions of the San Antonio North Expressway, although it
admitted that it would be able to use elsewhere any surplus in the
annual allotment to the state from federal highway trust funds
that resulted from removing the previous reservation of funds
for the San Antonio project. But, if the state highway
department's general power to allocate federal aid funds among
various highway projects is relied on by courts to justify the
application of federal grant conditions to road building activities
which are wholly state financed, the courts will have gone some
distance toward "federalizing" all the activities of state highway
departments which are carried out on routes which are within
the general classifications eligible for federal funding. This result
would upset the basic scheme of the grant-in-aid program.142 To
be sure, there must come a time when proper claimants can
enforce federal standards. But enforcement should normally be
1401d at 1027. Ironically, these plaintiffs are in the unusual position of having a state
statute which might have provided a state claim. Id at 1029 (Clark, J., dissenting).
141See Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Thompson v.
Fugate,
347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
14 2
The "partnership" analogy to Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275 (1958), employed by the court in San Antonio, 446 F.2d at 1027, is inapposite. There
was no question of withdrawal in that case, only the issue of whose law applied in a
contest with third parties.
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directed at DOT. Otherwise, the first step in the process of
qualification for federal funds locks the state into compliance
with federal standards conditioning a federal grant that the state
may decide it does not want because it will result in a project that
the state does not wish to undertake. 143 This hardly seems the
statutory scheme Congress had in mind.144 In fact, Congress has
recently acted to prevent San Antonio's conception 5of the
highway program from becoming the wave of the future. 14
2. Review of Federal Administrative Enforcement
a. ProceduralIssues
The federal courts have encountered considerable procedural underbrush in reaching the more substantive issues in
highway litigation. Although the Federal Highway Administration and DOT have persistently fought against the rationalization of doctrines such as standing, reviewability, ripeness and
sovereign immunity, the courts have been almost uniformly
sensible and progressive in resolving these issues. The standing
issue has been dispensed with for any reasonable class of
plaintiffs having some local coloration by the now classic cases of
Road Review League v. Boyd'46 and Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe. 147 Sierra Club v. Morton 148 rejects the theory of
Hudson Valley that longstanding concern and expertise in an area
are sufficient to confer standing, but there seems no reason to
believe that the requirement of an allegation of some harm to the
plaintiff will severely inhibit antihighway litigants. 49 The
143The conflict between the state and DOT over the North Expressway project in
San Antonio seemed virtually irreconcilable before the last round of private litigation.
But the plaintiff quite properly perceived that the Secretary had given away too many

chips to avoid a final surrender. With the court's restoration of DOT's position of
influence by denial of its power to "segment" its approval, I have no quarrel. 446 F.2d at
1022-23.
144See, e.g., Statement by Administrator Turner, in Hearingon the Report on the Statusof
the Federal-AidHighway ProgramBefore the Subcomm. on Roads ofthe Senate Comm. on Public

Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-31 (1970).
145The authorization of the appropriation of Federal funds or their availability for
expenditure under this chapter shall in no way infringe on the sovereign
rights of the States to determine which projects shall be federally financed.
The provisions of this chapter provide for a federally assisted State
program.
Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. Q3-87, § 123(a), 87 Stat. 261-62.
Congress also specifically removed the San Antonio North Expressway from the federalaid system. Id 154(a), 87 Stat. 276.
146270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
147425 F.2d 97, 102-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 949 (1970).
148405 U.S. 727,736 n.9 (1972).
149 Ste, e.g., Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Md. 1972).
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Supreme Court has made clear that findings required of the
Secretary of DOT are reviewable - at least where there is no
clear showing of a legislative intent to prohibit judicial review
and where the presence of "law to apply" indicates that the
question has not been committed to agency discretion.5 ', Finally,
recognizing that the time span from the conception to the
construction of a highway may easily be a decade, that there are
substantial commitments of public resources at various stages of
this process, and that the meaningful application of federal
conditions cannot await the final commitment of federal funds,
the courts have cut through the government's alternating claims
of lack of finality and laches to reach sound results.'5 '
Even when these preliminary thickets have been penetrated,
plaintiffs reaching the merits of their review petitions are often
still in some sense talking procedure. Most complainants who
have succeeded in obtaining an order against the Secretary have
52
claimed a failure by the state to hold adequate public hearings,'
a failure to file an environmental impact statement15 3 or the
failure of the Secretary to make a finding that is required of
him. 14 In these cases there is generally a fairly straightforward
question of law involved, that is, was the particular procedural
step or finding, which admittedly was omitted, required in this
particular case. The interpretive issue may not be easy, but it is
clearly within the traditional competence of the reviewing court.
A number of suits contesting the adequacy of environmental
impact statements filed pursuant to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act have also been successful.' 55
But again these victories were essentially procedural. The courts
may be quite searching in their inquiry into the adequacy of the
impact statement, but they generally recognize that NEPA
15 0

SeeCitizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410-13 (1971).
151See, e.g., Citizens' Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Township of Hopewell v. Volpe, 2 BNA ENV.
REP.CAS. 1089 (D.N.J. 1969), affla 446 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1971); Hanley v. Volpe, 305 F.
Supp. 977 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
Despite these rulings, DOT's position in San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1023 (5th Cir. 1971), concerning the time at which the
Secretary's § 138 findings were required, seems indicative of a continuing willingness to
manipulate timing problems in an attempt to avoid review. See the dissents of Justices
Black and Douglas from the denial of certiorari in this case prior to appeal to the Fifth
Circuit,
400 U.S. 968, 970-72, 976-77 (1970).
152E.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cerl denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
t53
E.g., Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
'54 E.g., San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Volpe, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
55
1 See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe,
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requires only that certain inquiries be made and spread on the
record. The agency's discretion to choose among competing
environmental considerations or to make judgments which trade
off environmental considerations against social or economic
concerns is not confined appreciably by the NEPA requirements."'6
b.

Substantive Review of the Secretary'sDecision

A few cases have gotten past the procedural issues to the
substantive question whether the decision taken by the Secretary
was within the applicable boundaries of reasonable judgment.
The meaningful definition of these boundaries is, as usual, one of
administrative law's great puzzles. Moreover, in the highway
program the combination of the nature of the federal standards,
the traditional modes of agency operation and the federal-state
division of responsibility make the determination of an appropriate role for a reviewing court particularly difficult.
(i) Review Under Provisions Narrowly Limiting the Secretary's Authority: Overton Parkand Section 138.
Like the San A ntonio Conservation Society case, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe "5 7 involved Secretary Volpe's
approval under section 138 of title 23 of a project which would
take certain parklands - this time in Memphis. There was,
however, no question that parklands would in fact be taken nor
that federal aid was to be used in the project. The plaintiffs
challenged both the Secretary's failure to make formal findings
to accompany his approval of the project and the merits of his
decision, contending that there were available to the state
highway department "feasible and prudent alternatives" to the
taking of the parklands and that "all possible planning," within
the meaning of section 138, had not been done to preserve the
park should some of its land have to be used for highway
purposes. Because the absence of findings meant that there was
350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash.
1972) (all 1-95 freeway cases).
See,
e.g., Pizitz v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENv. REP. CAS. 1195 (M.D. Ala., afJ'd per curiam,
467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 479 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cerL denied, 93 S. Ct. 2749 (1973);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972). But see
Comment, JudicialReview ofFactualIssues Under the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Ac 51
REV.U.S.
408 (1972).
ORE.L.
1.57401
402 (197 1).
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no written record of the reasons for his decision or the factors he
considered in making it, the question whether the Secretary
acted within his authority in finding that the section 138 criteria
were satisfied was determined on the basis of affidavits submitted
by the Secretary to the trial court. Nothing found in the affidavits
suggested that the Secretary had exceeded his authority, and
hence the district court upheld his decision."5 8 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, ultimately on the
narrow ground that review on the basis of affidavits prepared for
litigation was not review on the whole record as required by the
160
Administrative Procedure Act.
In reaching this result, however, Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, attempted to provide a basic structure for judicial
review of federal-aid highway funding decisions. After a rather
academic raising and rejection of the polar positions on scope of
review (nonreviewability and de novo review) and of review for
substantial evidence in the record, 16 1 the reviewing court's role
was articulated as one of determining whether the agency had
acted within the scope of its authority; had not taken action
which was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion; and
had met necessary procedural requirements. 162 Although the first
two inquiries are difficult to separate, the "scope of authority"
question is said to involve an inquiry into whether the Secretary
"properly construed" his statutory authority and could have, on
the facts available, reasonably believed that his action was within
that proper range of his authority. The "arbitrariness" inquiry
seems somewhat more searching in that it asks whether the
Secretary actually considered the relevant factors and made no
clear error of judgment.
Abstractly considered there is no problem with this
formulation, but as the Court noted there are some functional
difficulties. The first is the matter of a record upon which to
evaluate agency action in the light of the enunciated review
criteria. With few exceptions 163 the legislation under which the
FHWA and the Secretary of DOT operate does not require
formal findings of fact or law when approving or disapproving
grants. Therefore, courts are unable to look to a formal report to
1.8309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).

'59432
F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970).
'60 E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
161401 U.S. at 410, 413-17.
1621d at 415-17.
16 3E.g., National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)
(1970), DOT Order 5610.1A (Oct. 4, 1971).
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ascertain whether the Administrator acted reasonably and within
his scope of authority in making an administrative determination. Further, since there is no requirement that the Secretary or
the Administrator act solely on the basis of matters presented at
public hearings, a court purporting to review an action on the
whole record must look to all of the facts and reports that were
before the officer at the time of his decision. This necessarily
involves the court in a lengthy and complex examination of
factual inputs into the administrative process.
But even this detailed sort of inquiry may not be sufficient,
for, as the Supreme Court has noted, "the bare record may not
disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's
construction of the evidence ....,641 If not, testimony from the
administrative decisionmakers concerning their actions and the
factual bases for those actions may be required. While an inquiry
into the mental processes of administrators is to be avoided
whenever possible, 1 5 the Court was prepared to permit such an
examination where there were no formal administrative findings
at the time of the decision.,66 Indeed, on remand the district
court in Overton Park did admit extensive testimony concerning
the mental processes of those involved in the decision, but it was
nevertheless forced to hypothesize to some
extent about what the
7
Secretary believed at the time he acted.1
The desirability of this process of review is questionable.
Any explanation that is offered by the administrator is suspect as
a post hoc rationalization. 68 The absence of a contemporaneous
record against which to check a present reconstruction of events
hinders a searching inquiry consistent with the dignity of the
defendant and at the same time increases suspicions of
impropriety.6 9 When this is combined with the burdensomeness
of testifying, one could hardly blame the Secretary were he 17to0
delegate his section 138 responsibilities, as he has most others,
164401 U.S. at 420.

165 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
165401 U.S. at 420. Secretary Volpe, for example, testified for an extended period
concerning his approval of the Three Sisters Bridge in Washington, D.C. See D.C. Fed'n
of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754, 760-61 & n.12 (D.D.C. 1970).
167 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 883 (W.D.
Tenn. 1972).
16SSeeCitizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. 402,420 (1971); D.C. Fed'n
of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16 91n D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the absence of both formal findings and an administrative record seems to have taken on
independent
significance.
17°Seetext
accompanying note 67 supra.
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to Division Engineers in the FHWA. This would, of course,
eliminate decisionmaking by persons who do not have a
"highway orientation."
No matter who actually makes the decisions, the Secretary's
prospects of being upheld on review do not seem very good if he
allows the taking of parklands. Under the Overton Park
interpretation of section 138, his findings must show that he
approved the taking only because an alternative route was "not
feasible" as an engineering matter or "not prudent" in the sense
of "uniquely difficult." That the alternatives require taking
businesses and residences is not unique."' Should the Secretary's
decision be justified on this very restricted interpretation of his
statutory authority there is still the problem of showing that all
"possible" planning has been done to minimize harm. Given the
Court's view of "prudent" and "feasible," one is tempted to
conclude that the "all possible planning" requirement in the
hands of reasonably competent counsel translates the language
of section 138 into a simple "Thou shalt take no parkland for
172
federal-aid highway purposes."
Because Secretary Volpe had obviously not understood
section 138 to sweep so broadly, an eventual remand of the
Overton Park question was almost inevitable. 173 On reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's directives, the Secretary
refused to approve the Overton Park route and promptly had
the question remanded to him again by the district court, this
time on the petition of the State of Tennessee. 174 The state
objected to the Secretary's failure to find that there were no
feasible or prudent alternatives. This action was unaccompanied
by an affirmative declaration that any alternative was found to be
feasible and prudent and the state contended that this omission
was fatal to the validity of the Secretary's new decision. The
district court agreed with the state on the ground that without
such a declaration the court could not provide the state with that
careful judicial scrutiny of administrative action mandated by
the Supreme Court.
While the irony of this turn of events is fine, the Secretary's
position is no laughing matter. He has before him a record on the
171401 U.S. at 411-12.
72
' But see Citizens to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972).
173
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn.

1972).
174

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 357 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn.
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basis of which both the Tennessee Highway Department and the
Federal Highway Administrator concluded that there is no
175
feasible and prudent alternative to the Overton Park route.
Such a record may not support a finding that any particular
alternative route is feasible and prudent. If it does, one would
suspect that it does so, at least in part, on the basis of the evidence
adduced by the original plaintiff. In that case the Secretary's
decision is at least partially at the mercy of the plaintiff's choice
among suggested alternative routes. Indeed, whatever the final
outcome of that specific case it seems reasonably clear that
Overton Park's interpretation of section 138 has shifted some of
the functional power to locate federally aided highways from
state and federal highway officials to persons interested in
preserving parks.
These events, however, do not necessarily foretell a
substantial redistribution of the power to make highway needs,
location or design decisions via the medium of judicial review.
The broader lesson of Overton Park is that the interpretation of
the statute, 17 6 not the articulation of the scope of review, is the
critical question. Given a statutory interpretation which narrowly confines the Secretary's authority, his decisions will be
reversible by even a narrowly conceived exercise of judicial
review. The principle can also work in reverse. Given the same
scope of review, claims under sections of the Federal-Aid
Highways Acts which grant the Secretary a broader discretion
may be met with a marked reluctance among judges to reverse
administrative decisions.
(ii) Review Under Less Restrictive Provisions of the Highway
Code
Most of the provisions of the Federal-Aid Highways Acts
will not bear the sort of narrow interpretation placed on section
138 in Overton Park,A good example of the role ofjudicial review
under fuzzier standards is Road Review League v. Boyd' 177 The
plaintiffs there claimed that FHWA's approval of the location of
a link in the interstate system in New York was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to give adequate weight to environ5

17 1d at
17

849, 851 n.3.

'1n this writer's view the Overton Park interpretations of § 138 are highly suspect.
As the court recognized, its interpretation is not supported by the legislative history, 401
U.S. at 412 n.29, and the principle of the inherent superiority of parks over housing
seems somehow unlikely to have commended itself to the Congress.
177270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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mental considerations

78

or to local needs 179 and local plan-

ning.' 80

Although the facts required for a thorough feel for the
case are too extensive to bear recitation here, it is fair to say that
the plaintiffs had compiled persuasive evidence in favor of an
alternative route which had originally been chosen by the New
York Department of Highways. However, the inability of the
plaintiffs to point to any standard in the federal statute or
regulations which was to be given decisive, or even primary,
weight seems to have tipped the balance. The court said,
Planning is an important factor, but it is only one factor
out of several, just as cost is only one factor. The same
is true of conservation. The ultimate question is
whether the overall decision, viewed in the light of all
the competing factors, was arbitrary. Here certain
factors are clearly in favor of [the route approved by
FHWAI. Others seem to me to weigh more heavily in
favor of the westerly route than [the Administrator]
thought they did.
....

The decision must be allowed to stand unless it was

plainly wrong. I have reviewed this entire lengthy
record and I have given this matter considerable
thought. Having done so, I conclude that this administrative decision was not wrong enough to permit this
court to upset it. 181
Although Boyd represents the most probable judicial
response to the claims of antihighway plaintiffs, a description of
the place of judicial review in highway decisionmaking must
contend with a contrary trend which appears in the formidable
jurisprudence generated by road building in and around the
District of Columbia, particularly the projected Three Sisters
Bridge. The level and length of the conflict in that area seems
unprecedented, and I shall not attempt to recite the full tale here.
I will sketch the view which the courts in the D.C. litigation have
taken of the role of a reviewing court under the Federal-Aid
Highways Acts; explain briefly why this view seems inappropriate; and inquire into what can be expected of the Federal
178 The plaintiffs' environmental claims rested on a general policy expressed in
Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, § 15(a), 80 Stat. 771, as amended,
23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970), and in a general regulation at 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(c) (1973). A 1968
amendment to the highway code produced the strict criteria discussed in Overton Park
Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 18(a), 82 Stat. 823.
17923 U.S.C. §§ 101 (b), 109(a) (2) (1970).
'1od § 134.
1270 F. Supp. at 663. See Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 463
F.2d 402, 404-05 (4th Cir. 1972); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252 (WD. Wash. 1972).
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Highway Administration and the Secretary of Transportation in
response to these decisions and others like them.
The Three Sisters Bridge case has been decided no less than
four times in the district court and three times in the court of
appeals.18 2 The conflict has become something of a cause celebrein
the capital, not only because of the traditional protesters'
prostrations before the machinery of "progress," but also
because it has become entangled with the questions of subway
183
appropriations and home rule for the District in the Congress.
For present purposes the last two rounds in this donnybrook are
the most interesting. In the district court's fourth try at the case it
held: (1) that appropriate public hearings had not been held; (2)
that the FHWA Division Engineer had acted unreasonably in
finding that the bridge was of a design "conducive to safety,
durability, and economy of maintenance;" 184 and (3) that
FHWA could not accept the certification of the Chief of the
District of Columbia Department of Highways and Traffic's
Office of Engineering that the "economic, social and environmental"1 8 5 effects of the project had been considered because that
official did not have personal charge of the planning staff who
would have investigated these issues. 186 On appeal these rulings
were upheld, and the following grounds for enjoining federal
funding, which had been put forward by the plaintiffs but had
been rejected by the district court, were added: that not only a
design hearing but also a new location hearing must be held; that
the Secretary's approval under section 138 was without
authority since final design plans for certain access ramps had
not been submitted at the time he gave it; that the finding of
consistency of the project with local planning was not based on
an understanding that the statute18 7 required the Division
Engineer to exercise his independent judgment rather than
accepting the views of a local planning agency; that to the fullest
extent practical the Secretary would have to resolve any
questions covering the safety of riverbed conditions; that the
8

' 2D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Airis, 275 F. Supp. 533, 540 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd,
391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968); D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 308 F. Supp. 423
(D.D.C), rev'd, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C.
1970),83 rev'a 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1 See D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754, 759, 762-63 (D.D.C.
1970).84
1 23 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1) (1970).
185 1d § 128.
186D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754, 785, 789, 792-93 (D.D.C.
1970).
18723 U.S.C. § 134 (1970).
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Division Engineer had failed to consider the effects of air
pollution in his "safety determination" under section 109 of title
23; 188 and that on remand the Secretary must make his
determination strictly on the merits without regard to a factor
not made relevant by the statute-political pressure from
Representative Natcher, Chairman of the Appropriations SubCommittee for the District of Columbia, who threatened to
bottle up funds for Washington's Metro System unless the Three
Sisters Bridge and the freeway it was to serve were constructed
forthwith.
Some of these holdings are quite similar to those we have
encountered in other cases, for example, the reinforcement of
the public hearing requirement and the strict application of
section 138. Similarly the "local planning" and "safety and
durability" holdings are arguably within reasonably well-worn
paths. The first involved what the court took to be an error in
statutory interpretation, and the second was based on the
Division Engineer's own testimony that he had very grave
doubts about the feasibility of the design he approved. But
cumulatively, and in some instances taken alone, the improprieties discovered by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reflect a quite different approach to the review of
highway planning than has appeared elsewhere. At least three
aspects of these opinions require some comment.
First, the emphasis on political pressure seems misplaced. It
presumes that the Federal-Aid Highways Acts establish a closed
set of criteria on the basis of which decisions can be made
concerning where, when and how highways are to be built. On
the contrary, as we have noted, the question of the "need" for
highways is essentially political. Although one can appreciate
how the issue of home rule or at least a modicum of selfdetermination for the District of Columbia (whose planners were
not enamored of the bridge) and the Congressman's highhandedness might influence the court's judgment, it does not violate
the spirit of federal highway legislation to trade Representative
Natcher a bridge for a subway.
The holding that the Division Engineer's decision concerning safety should be upset because there was no study of air
pollution is also unsettling. The Division Engineer was probably
"'Contra, Concerned Citizens of Marlboro v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir.
1972). The Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1970 included air, noise and water pollution as
separate consideration. 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
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equally ignorant of the flight patterns of migratory birds and the
chances for a tidal wave in the Chesapeake Bay. Was there some
special impact of air pollution on safety here that cried out for
detailed inquiry? If so, it does not appear from the opinions.
Surely the opponents of a highway project should be required to
establish the necessity for further study before the court upsets
the highway planner's selection from the universe of possible
considerations those most likely to have some immediate
relevance to his decision.
Finally, the requirement that FHWA make its own decision
on consistency with local planning misconceives both the reach
of section 134 of title 23 and the nature of local planning. In this
case, the Division Engineer was faced with two conflicting
reports: a report from the National Capital Planning Commission which said the bridge was unnecessary and undesirable and
a report from the Transportation Planning Board of the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments which
approved the facility as a part of a regional transportation
system. He elected to follow the advice of the latter agency,
which had jurisdictional authority for both ends of the bridge,
and was told by the court of appeals to go back and consider for
himself whether the project is "consistent with sound transportation planning for the region."' 89 This language is strikingly
similiar to language proposed and rejected by the Congress for
incorporation into section 134.190
Presumably this requirement of independent federal evaluation would apply whether the overlapping planning agencies
agreed or disagreed. Hence, if both agencies were in opposition,
the Secretary might yet approve the project, or if both were in
favor, he could reject it; the single planning agency situation
would be treated similarly. But on what basis might these
decisions be made? Could the Secretary reject the goals and
values of the local planners? Or perhaps, the Secretary could
merely take the local agency's plan and deduce that there was an
incongruity between its ultimate goals and the means by which
the local planners envisioned achieving those goals.
Neither proposal makes much sense. To reject the goals or
189459 F.2d at 1240 (emphasis added).
19 0 See Hearings on S. 3136 and H.R. 12135 Before the Subcomnm. on Roads of the House
Comm. on Public Works, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Hearings on H.R. 9725, H.R. 9848 &
H.R. 11199 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on Public Works, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); Hearingson H.R. 12135 and S. 3136 Before the Subcomm on Public Roads of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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values of the local planners is simply to substitute the federal
officer's preferences for the local political process, a result which
Congress may be deemed not to have intended in requiring local
planning. Nor may the Secretary defensibly reject the local
planners' approval of the project on the ground that the project
does not really fit the agency's plan. The Secretary cannot
determine with any greater precision than the local planner what
the locality's goals are, how the transportation system effects
those goals and certainly not how a particular project will affect
them. Planning is after all only a collection of better or worse
methods for the manipulation of predictions about the future
which are about to be encased in concrete.' 9' It is because those
predictions are value-laden and therefore express the political
preferences of the political process to which the planner is
responsive that the Congress required local planning. If the
Secretary substitutes his "independent judgment" concerning
whether the local planners' plan is "sound," in reality he will
merely be substituting his goals or values for theirs.
In sum, the court of appeals reveals a preference for
highway planning which is nonpolitical, rational, exhaustive and
federal, and this preference becomes, in effect, a set of
assumptions which color its review of agency action under the
terms of the statute. This is doubtless a possible model for
highway decisionmaking, but it is probably not the model
Congress constructed. It is certainly not the system under which
the Federal Highway Administration and state highway departments have been operating. The court's mandate to reform the
decision process in its own image is uncertain at best. Nor is it
clear why changes in the decision process of the sort the court
requires will result in "better" decisions, save perhaps in the
special sense of being more palatable to the plaintiffs in highway
litigation.
Nevertheless, while I disagree with the approach of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, I find its position wholly
understandable. There is a progressive logic to judicial review
which tends to push administrative action into a conceptual mold
that employs clear divisions of function, sharp criteria for
judgment and detailed explanation of reasons. Questions of
administrative discretion or judgment are sharply formulated by
the well-drawn complaints of antihighway plaintiffs. The
19 1

See, e.g., Tabb, Alternative Futures and DistributionalPlanning,38J. AM. INST. PL 25

(1972).
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influence of history, of intergovernmental politics, of the
nonscientific side of planning, or of funding priorities on
decisionmaking is difficult to reproduce. Such factors appear in
the mouths of the defendants to be lame explanations for
incompetence or evasion of legislative mandates. And so the
administrator is once again trapped between a legislature which
finds rationalization of his program impossible and a reviewing
court which insists that the exercise of judgment not outrun
cogent articulation of policy.
Should the D.C. Court of Appeals' approach to judicial
review be generalized to other courts, one would expect that the
Federal Highway Administration will respond in the timehonored fashion of the bureaucracy put on the defensive. It will
shift some of its energies toward establishing explicit bases for its
decisions, and will exercise more care when dealing with the
formal or procedural requirements of the Federal-Aid Highways
Acts and related legislation. In so doing it will to some degree
alter the internal dynamics of highway decisionmaking and
thereby shift to some unpredictable extent toward the emphasis
on "nonhighway" values that its opponents are urging upon it.
This new stance is likely to reestablish credibility in the eyes of.
the judiciary and limit the "success" of parties seeking judicial
review of FHWA decisions.
In one sense the litigation which is being instituted by
antihighway plaintiffs (and which shows little sign of abatement)
is a skirmish over limited objectives. A few miles of highway will
be cancelled and a few more rerouted. 192 Most of the contested
highways will eventually be built as planned. Moreover, if the
judicial pressure on the federal grantor agency becomes too
intense, Congress may simply nullify the tactical leverage that
the threat of litigation has given highway opponents in the
administrative process. Congress has moved in that direction
with the passage of section 116 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highways
Act of 1973.1 93 That provision delegates significant decisional
192As of May 6, 1970, 20.3 miles of the Interstate System had been deleted because of
controversy. The total system is 42,500 miles. EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT, supra note
102, pt. 5, at 1057. The Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1973 may result in more significant
deletions. It allows the Secretary to withdraw his approval of any portion of the interstate
system on the request of a state governor and the local governments concerned. The
plans for an interstate segment may be scrapped in favor of "a nonhighway public mass
transit project involving the construction of fixed rail facilities ..... Pub. L. No. 93-87, §
137(a), 87 Stat. 268-70. Of course, withdrawals under this section, if they occur, will be
the result of political agitation, not court proceedings, although the latter may be used as
a political
device in this context.
93
1 pub. L. No. 93-87, § 116(a), 87 Stat. 258.
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authority over the use of federal-aid funds to states which certify
to the Secretary that highway projects on federal-aid systems
within that state will be carried out in accordance with state
requirements at least as stringent as those contained in title 23
and the regulations issued under it. The delegation is not
complete. The Administrator is not relieved of his responsibilities under NEPA, for instance, or the Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act. But the delegation clause does cover provisions
of the federal code which have been, or might have proved to be,
of significant importance to antihighway plaintiffs, such as the
requirement that all adverse economic, social and environmental
effects be considered before approval of plans, specifications and
estimates, 194 and -section 134's requirement of consistency of
federal-aid projects with the local planning process. 9" Presumably, when a delegation is made the need for an independent
federal determination is eliminated, 196 and judicial review of the
Secretary's action would be limited to technical questions, such
as whether the 9 appropriate
certification had been made by a
7
particular state.

But the highway litigation of the past few years may have
accomplished something of lasting importance in moving the
discussion of highway building into a more neutral and public
forum and in giving it considerable public exposure. Although
intensely frustrating for many of the participants, highway
controversies do have the virtue of opening up public debates at
all levels concerning such fundamental issues as the future shape
of the urban space in which most of us live. The federal-aid
highway program may thus become a focal point for a renewed
interest in the question of how decisionmaking about public
works projects should be organized. It is to this latter question
that the remainder of this essay is directed.
V. SOME SOLUTIONS TO THE HIGHWAY PROBLEMS

A.

Tinkering with the FinancingScheme

If the previous analysis of the functioning of the federal-aid
highway program is at all consistent with reality, there are many
aspects of the program which might be considered problems19423 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
95
1 Id § 134(a).

196 SeePennsylvania
197

Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
SeeD.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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that is, which might be thought to interfere with the establishment of an effective means of public choice about highway
construction. There is the trust fund, which skews federal
transportation investment toward road building. There is the
90-10 or 70-30 aid formula for states, which makes highway
investment worthwhile to the state if that investment has benefits
equaling 10% or 30% of its costs. There is the pervasive
ambiguity of the intergovernmental relationship in a grant-inaid program, which colors much of federal administration and
many attempts at legal control through judicial review of official
action.
Of course one may argue that these characteristics of the
present funding system for the highway program do not skew
decisionmaking at all-that the trust fund is necessary to
neutralize the otherwise unreasonable risks in beginning longterm and large-scale public works projects on the basis of naked
legislative promises of annual funding, and that the federal share
of highway building pays merely for benefits to the nation which
are external to the jurisdiction which does the construction.
There is obviously something to these arguments. Yet given the
superficial implausibility of the notions that only highway public
works projects involve financial risks which require trust
funding, and that seventy to ninety percent of the benefits of all
federally aided roads accrue to people outside the jurisdiction of
the state in which they are built, it would seem reasonable to
allocate to their proponents the burden of factual proof.
There are several rather straightforward ways of altering the
present funding system to eliminate the distortions which
probably do exist under the present system. One alternative, the
transportation trust fund, finally received the endorsement of the
Secretary of Transportation 198 and has been given a limited trial
in the Federal-Aid Highways Act of 1973.' 99 Trust funds
allocated to the federal-aid urban system will be available in the
next fiscal year for the construction of fixed rail facilities and the
20 0
purchase of trains as well as buses for highway mass transit.
Under this new funding system, the positive skewing for
highway building, in urban areas at least, might be eliminated
over the years. But there might still be a bias in favor of
transportation projects as against other sorts of expenditure.
That problem could be ameliorated only by excising the fund's
1981972 HIGHWAYNEEDS REPORT, supra note 76, pt. 1, at 22-26, 42.
99
210 0Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250.
1d § 121 (a), 87 Stat. 259-61.
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dedicated-revenues-for-construction feature and redesigning it
for general long term planning purposes.
Even with some version of the transportation fund, a
federal-aid system will still face the problem of determining the
appropriate state and federal shares. One possibility would be to
distribute one-half of the federal revenues to the Secretary of
Transportation and one-half to the states on the basis of a
formula which weights population and land area equally. The
states would be allowed to spend their share (plus, of course,
their own resources) on any transportation or transportationrelated project. The Secretary could do likewise by entering into
contracts with the states. Thus, under a distribution of one-half
available federal funds to states and one-half to DOT, federal
control over the placement and design of any facility would
come simply from what the federal government could bargain
for with its half of the allocation of federal funds to transportation. Although far from perfect, such a scheme might result in
projects which more nearly approximated the returns to interests
within and without a state than do projects under the current
formulae.
An alternative to the fifty-fifty division might be to divide
the transportation network into federal and state responsibilities.
For example, the federal government might take full responsibility for designated interstate highways, rail lines and air
routes, leaving the provision of other transportation facilities to
the states and localities. The federal, state and local governments
would be free to bargain about common facilities at points of
intersection or tangency and about the placement and design of
relatively independent projects. These suggestions are, of course,
very sketchy, but they are perhaps sufficient to suggest that
funding systems are possible which would significantly reduce
the influence of the financing system over the allocation of public
support among transportation modes. Decisionmaking responsibility under these schemes would also be more sharply focused
by relatively clear divisions between federal and state interests.
Basic political questions of how those responsibilities should be
structured and legally controlled could be decided differently
within each level of government without producing unseemly
conflicts between levels concerning who is really in charge and
whose law applies to whom.
Yet even if these substantial changes were made, there
would remain a primary and unresolved problem of public
choice concerning transportation policy. By what criteria and

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 122:1

processes do we, as a nation, a state or a locality, decide when
and where to build any particular transportation facility or
transportation system?
B.

Facing the Problem of Public Choice
1. Organizational Solutions

We have already outlined in some detail an excellent
example of one strategy for making public investment decisions.
The current requirements of the Federal-Aid Highways Acts, the
National Environmental Policy Act and the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act establish a complex process within which many
different personal and institutional values may be brought to
bear on the decision to undertake a particular project. This
"pluralist" structure has been criticized because it presently is
skewed in the direction of building highways. But that
"skewing" can be corrected by reforms in the existing funding
techniques. With some further changes in the current statutory
requirements to allow bargaining between federal, state and local
interests, we might provide an effective method of public choice.
I would suggest, however, that the state and federal
departments of transportation, which under this model would
coordinate with other agencies, hold public hearings and
consider economic, social and environmental values, could in the
context of this new decision process be expected to have the
same or at least similar problems legitimizing their decisions as
do the present administrators of the state and federal highway
programs. They almost certainly will still be building highways,
and the same interests which oppose highways now will almost as
certainly continue their opposition. Presumably, the federal and
state departments of transportation will also elect to build other
types of transportation facilities, which will be opposed by
others-or indeed perhaps by the same interests that now oppose
highways. For, should the motor car become significantly
cleaner over the next few years while the difficulties of disposing
of the wastes from producing electric power become substantially greater, it is not at all clear that the environmentalist who
now advocates the rapid rail alternative will continue to do so.
Moreover, the construction of mass transit facilities has great
potential for economic, social and environmental dislocations, a
potential which is easy to ignore because we have in recent years
built so few of them. Thus, even if money is shifted from
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highways to subways or highspeed commuter trains, claims that
particular values or interests are not being given appropriate
weight in the decision calculus will again be made; indeed, the
foregoing analysis suggests that such claims will emerge in any
public works program of similar scope. Organizational responses
to these pressures may involve movements in either of two
directions: toward justification of decisionmaking in terms of
rationality, or toward increased democratization of the decision
making process.
a. Rationality and the Systems Approach
Historically, the questions of the proper relationship of
various transportation modes in meeting the transportation
needs of the country and of the relationship of transportation to
other national and community goals have been approached
piecemeal. Federal decisionmaking has been concerned almost
exclusively with the promotion and regulation of discrete parts
of the total transportation network. Many decry this lack of
systematic planning. 20 1 Indeed, the call for increased rationality
through systems planning has for some years been heard in the
land. To take a page from the systems literature the problem is to
get rid of the traditional "incrementalist" and "satisficing"
strategies that permeate public decisionmaking and move to a
rational and comprehensive approach: "In redesigning many of
its urban systems society needs more than an incrementalist or a
satisficer; presumably it is just that sort of decisionmaker who is
responsible for the current need to rethink the nature and form
2°2
of these systems.
This position is representative of one of the major lines of
political and administrative thought in the postwar era and
particularly in the last decade. As more and more programs are
seen to be both inadequate to the tasks to which they were
addressed and perhaps seriously detrimental to the achievement
of other goals, our reaction has understandably been to look for
the causes of our frustration in the piecemeal or programmatic
approach to problem solving that has been employed. Surely
there must be something for the administrators of public works
programs in the "interrelatedness" cliches which accost us at
every rhetorical turn.
2Ol. BURBY, supranote73.
20 Skjei, Urban Systems Advocacy, 38J. AM.INsT. PL.11 (1972).
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This basic instinct has been reinforced enormously by the
staggering success of the government-industry team involved in
the space program. We are led to believe (and there seems no
good reason to doubt it) that that success is based in no small
measure on the rigorous analytical approach to problem solving
that was employed there. That approach includes at least the
following steps: a comprehensive definition of the environment
within which the program or system to be designed will
function; a detailed description of system components; a
statement of the objectives to be attained and performance
criteria for the system as a whole and its components; a
description of alternative criteria and means for achieving
system goals; evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of system
alternatives within the specified environmental framework. This
"systems" approach to highly complex problems is made
technically feasible by sophisticated computers and computer
programs which store, retrieve and manipulate the mass of data
required to simulate system performance and
thereby "debug" it
20 3
operation.
actual
into
goes
system
before the
This is obviously a very attractive analytical approach, not
only because it is "scientific" and successful but also because it
looks like applied common sense and seems to guard against
"forgetting what we are trying to do," "left hands not knowing
what right hands are doing," and "waste"-faults commonly
ascribed to governmental (or bureaucratic) operations. Indeed
so attractive was the systems approach that President Lyndon
Johnson announced within a year of his election in 1964 the
introduction of this "very new and very revolutionary system"
into the management of every executive department of the
federal government as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
System (PPBS).904 While PPBS as a budgetary and management
technique applicable to scores of different types of programs is
necessarily less mathematically rigorous than systems analysis as
203
Although popularized by the space program, systems approaches as a part of
general decision theory have a fairly long history in a number of fields and masquerade
under different labels. Among social theorists the more familiar jargon may be "basic

decision model," see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 258-59 (1967); Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy
DecisionProcess: Alternative Thinking and the PredictiveFunction,33 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 318

(1964); management specialists may prefer "operational research." General systems
theory has influenced theoretical writings in psychology, social psychology, sociology,
public administration, political science and law. See, e.g., W. BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND
MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY (1967); J. DAVISON & N. GRUNDSTEIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND THE REGULATORY SYSTEM (1966); PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT (R. Gagne ed. 1962).
24

Gross, The New Systems Budgeting, 29 PUB. AD. REV. 113, 114 (1969).
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employed by the purveyors and users of military and space
hardware, it nevertheless seeks to achieve similar ends: to place
program planning and budgeting within a broader framework of
goals and to promote consideration and cost-effectiveness
evaluation of alternative means to chosen ends. 20 -' Indeed, no
level of government has been immune to the infectious
attractiveness of the systems approach, 2 6 although PPBS has
now been abandoned as a required budgetary technique for
207
federal agencies.
There are remarkable similarities between the systems
analysis framework and the comprehensive planning process as
described by urban planners. The latter includes systematic
description of the present characteristics of the urban space;
projection of changes in those characteristics based on historical
trends; identification of community needs by comparing the
description and projections with community goals; development
of alternative means for meeting present or projected needs; and
evaluation of all alternative projects or policies for effectiveness
and consistency with other projects and policies. 20 8 And, within
the planning field, urban transportation studies have contributed
the most advanced techniques of mathematical analysis and
computer simulation. 20 9 The rapid adaptation of systems analysis
to transportation planning seems to have resulted from a number
of converging factors: federal money has been available in
sizeable amounts for highway transportation planning; transportation systems are easier to model than most other urban
subsystems; the private concerns (notably RAND) which had
been involved in military systems studies had early seen the
potential applications in the transportation field. Moreover, since
1965 the Office of High Speed Ground Transportation has been
engaged in a systems research program of mindboggling
magnitude. 2 '0 The object is the development of a comprehensive
2 05

For a general critique of the "comprehensive" approach to decisionmaking, see

D. BRAYBROOKE& C. LINDBLOM,A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963).
2 06

For a discussion of potential problems, see Mosher, Limitations and Problems of
PPBS
in the States.29 PUB.AD. REV. 160 (1969); Mushkin, PPB in Cities, id. 167.
207
Schick, A Death in the Bureaucracy: TheDemise ofFederalPPB,33 PUB. AD. REV. 146
(1973).
208
A succinct description may be found in CENTER FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL
STUDIES, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING PROCESS

(1968)
[hereinafter cited as THE PLANNING PROCESS].
209
See G. HEMMENS, URBAN DEVELOnMENT MODELING (1970) (Monograph No. 6,
Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University).
2 10
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THIRD REPORT ON THE HIGH SPEED GROUND

TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1965 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THIRD REPORT ON HSGTI.
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modeling technique for the evaluation of alternative intercity
transportation investments in the Northeast (Boston-Washington) Corridor. Although there seems to have been some
retrenchment from early goals,2 1' an effort has been made to go
beyond engineering considerations and even the economic
impacts of alternative systems to questions of effects on
''quality," "style of life" and social and institutional structures
212
within the community.
These developments suggest that an alternative legal
structure for transportation policy formation and implementation might be a general planning agency, legally required to
engage in comprehensive transportation planning. The criterion
for public investment in highways or other transportation
facilities would be its inclusion in the agency's master plan. In
part this is the approach of the transportation revenue sharing
bill sent to Congress in April of 1971. That bill would have
combined the major federal-aid programs for transportation,
eliminated trust fund limitations and made funds available to the
states on essentially one condition-the creation of state and
regional planning agencies to formulate general development
plans.2 13 The state and units of local government receiving passthrough funds would have included in these plans the projected
use of shared transportation revenues and the relationship of this
use to the overall plan.
But the substitution of a generalized and systems-analytic
planning process for the present system of decisionmaking does
not appear imminent. Indeed, it is doubtful that there exist
appropriate techniques by which the transportation planner
might derive an optimum transportation system. Techniques
employed in the development of hardware or limited manmachine systems have less capacity to adapt to areas where the
system's environment is complex and fluctuating, goals are
211

Compare

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NORTHEAST CORRIDOR TRANSPORTATION

PROJECT AND STUDY DESIGN, TECHNICAL PAPER No. 5 (1966) with THIRD REPORT ON
HSGT,
212 supra note 210.

This effort appeared more clearly in the CONSAD studies, e.g., CONSAD

RESEARCH CORP., DESIGN FOR IMPACT STUDIES, NORTHEAST CORRIDOR TRANSPORTA-

TION PROJECT (1965), but has by no means been abandoned by RAND. RAND CORP.,
MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS

(1969)
213(RAND Memorandum 5869-DOT).
S. 1693, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). That "planning" should become the ultimate
requirement in an intergovernmental system is given a diverting, mock-serious treatment
a la Parkinson in Kennedy, The Law of Appropriateness, PUB. AD. REV. 135, 141-43

(1972).
The use of plan conformity as a funding condition is found in a number of programs
and may occasionally be enforced. See, e.g., Johnson v. Russell, 3 BNA ENV. REP. CAS.
1523 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
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either disputable or highly abstract, system boundaries are
difficult to draw, and causal relationships are not established.
What, for example, are the goals of the state, the region or
the locality, and what is the order of priority for those goals? The
lack of clearly articulated public policy goals for most localities
has already been noted. Even if those goals have been articulated
and priorities are clear, they are not likely to provide a rule for
making specific public decisions. Agreement in the abstract on
planning goals must be limited to such nostrums as "orderly
growth," "maintenance of a healthful environment" and "the
provision of adequate transportation facilities." Whether a
particular transportation plan supports any of these objectives is
subject to highly subjective interpretation.
The transportation planner also has great difficulty establishing a sensible environment within which his transportation
system is to function. If he chooses the traditional trip
distribution approach in which alternatives are evaluated in
terms of their capacity to satisfy existing demands for movement
in the chosen urban (or suburban or rural) space, he is strongly
committed to the status quo. Because the model presumes
existing land uses served by existing modes of transportation at
existing price and service levels, it cannot-no matter how
sophisticated the computer program-reveal the land-use,
productivity or wealth consequences of a change in the type of
transportation provided. In order to trace these consequences
the planner would have to know the specific causal relationships
among the transportation and nontransportation variables in the
model. But those relationships are not well established; indeed,
they are highly disputable. Moreover, the more "soft" variables
that are introduced-such as environmental or social values
whose magnitude can only by "guesstimated"-the more likely
it is that large system or subsystem errors will result. Output
ultimately must be checked "intuitively," and often the data
must be "massaged" to make the model's predictions look
sensible. Hence, "comprehensive" transportation planning tends
to vacillate between rigorous but conceptually narrow justifications for incremental additions to the existing transportation
network and broadly based but unconvincing manipulations of
conjectural data according to hypothetical formulae.214
This necessity of choosing between planning which lacks
2 14

For a more extensive and rigorous critique of large scale modeling see Lee,
Requiem forLarge-Scale Models, 39J. AM.INST.PL. 163 (1973).
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comprehensiveness and planning whose trustworthiness is
highly suspect significantly detracts from the attractiveness of
comprehensive transportation planning as the primary means
for making decisions about transportation policy. Moreover, to
the extent that comprehensive planning involves "modeling,"
we may also wonder whether the techniques involved do not
shift a virtually unreviewable political power to the functionaries
who construct the models. In the evaluative stages of any systems
analysis of proposed transportation facilities, the analyst must
either translate all the factors which should be considered into a
common unit of measurement or admit that he is subjectively
comparing chalk and cheese. If he chooses the former course, he
must either leave out of account important but unquantifiable
factors or make some highly arbitrary assignments *ofvalues to
those factors. 21 5 At their best, those attempts at quantification and
systematic comparison of alternatives provide some real insights
into the potential effects of judgments which ultimately must be
made on the basis of preference. Often they obscure value choice
in a haze of technical detail.216 Within a systems analytic
framework, questions of what is to be considered and 21how
it is to
7
be measured are in fact questions of policy or politics.
Finally we may worry about how this sort of "result" or
"outcome-oriented" decisionmaking fits into our traditionally
pluralist and process-oriented politics. 21 8 Planners tend to
emphasize that planning is a "process" involving all elements of
the community, 219 yet they may also be heard to decry the results
of pluralistic decisionmaking. 220 Systems planning is a decisional
approach which seeks to optimize outcomes by rigorous
attention to the reciprocal effects of multiple ends and alternative
means. It is not designed to solve the problems of disenfranchisement inherent in the politics of pressure group activity. And its
2 15

See, e.g., RAND CORP., ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
(1969) (RAND Memorandum 5865-DOT); RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CORP., EXTERNAL
COSTS AND BENEFITS ANALYSES, NORTHEAST CORRIDOR TRANSPORTATION PROJECT

(1969).
21 6

See, e.g., Schlesinger, Two-and-a-HalfCheersfor Systems Analysis, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 395 (A. Westin ed., 1971) [hereinafter cited as
TECHNOLOGY
IN A DEMOCRACY].
2 17

See, e.g., the recent attempt to impose uniform evaluative policy on the analysis of
water resource projects, SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 92d CONG., 1st SESS.,
PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATION OF WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCE PROJECTS

(Comm.
Print 1971).
21
'See generally Schick, Systems Politics and Systems Budgeting, 29 PUB. AD. REV. 137
(1969).
2
'9THE PLANNING PROCESS, supranote 208, at 41-42.
2 20
URBAN PLANNING IN TRANSITION xvii (E. Erber ed. 1970).
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actual effect may be to narrow effective participation further by
raising the level of sophistication necessary for relevant
21
submissions by interested groups.2
This last point raises a major issue which permeates
contemporary concern with the processes of collective decisionmaking. As Erich Fromm has said, "Between the act of voting
and the most momentous high-level political decisions is a
connection which is mysterious. One cannot say that there is
none at all, nor can one say that the final decision is an outcome
of the voter's will. ' 222 If the connection between the traditional
expression of popular will and "momentous" and "high-level"
decisions is obscure, that relationship becomes even more
tenuous as one moves toward the "routine" and "low-level" end
of the decisional scale. Yet our "democratic morality" tells us
that universal and meaningful participation in decisionmaking is
both an instrumental and an ultimate value in a society dedicated
to maximum self-realization. 223 The civil rights movement and
the "discovery" of poverty have made these abstract considerations immediate concerns by revealing, at least in part, who is
being left out in the bargaining which takes place between voting
and the execution of policy. They have helped to expose the
myth that there is a "public interest" which is objectively
determinable by administrators, 224 and we have therefore begun
to search for political processes of decision which provide
access
225
and participation to everyone who is seriously affected.
Were we to adopt a "rational planning model" as the
appropriate decision process for making judgments about
transportation investments, we would have some difficulty
accommodating democratization while at the same time maintaining the integrity of the planning process. Some sense of the
difficulty can be derived from a preliminary examination of what
is actually involved in "citizen participation." If the phrase
means the equal opportunity of all interested parties to affect an
outcome, there arises immediately the problem of deciding who
are the interested parties. Even after that decision has been
made, the fact remains that some parties are more interested
22 1

See, e.g., Michael, Democratic Participationand TechnologicalPlanning,in TECHNOLOGY IN
A
22 2 DEMOCRACY, supra note 216, at 291.
E. FROMM, THESANE SOCIETY 191 (1955).
22 3
For an excellent discussion, see E. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THEADMINISTRATIVE
STATE6-9,
19-22 (1969).
22 4
Reich, The Law ofthe PlannedSociety, 75 YALELJ. 1227,1235 (1966).
225See, e.g., Plager & Handler, The Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment:
Strategies in the ManipulationofPublic Law, 1966 Wis.L. REv.724.
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than others-are more directly or seriously benefitted or
deprived. Of course, participation might be weighted in some
way to reflect differing intensities of interest. But democratization would also seem to require at least the mitigation of
differentials in ability to participate. Thus, effective participation
in the planning process would almost necessarily entail a
significant broadening of access to technical expertise. Even with
these refinements, however, democracy in planning may amount
to nothing more than political bargaining with a more diverse
and expanded cast of characters. If all that can be accomplished
is a more sophisticated way of fashioning policy out of trade-offs
among existing interests, democratization seems irreconcilable
with the basic concept of planning, which is to focus
systematically on long-range and widely shared goals. 226 This
apparent conceptual repugnance of planning to pluralist politics
should make us question a legal structure which put all its eggs in
the planning basket.
b.

Democratization: The Problem of Guarantees

Despite an avowed love of "democracy," however, it is
reasonably clear that we are not about to put all transportation
planning projects to a plebiscite. There are, of course, practical
grounds for eschewing this "pure democracy" model in the
public works arena; there are also perfectly sound theoretical
reasons for believing that referenda are democratic only in a
special sense. If intensity of interest should count for anything, a
process, like the current one, which allows trade-offs among
affected groups, is more "democratic" than a simple majority
voting system. 227 Nevertheless, in the real world of unequal
wealth distribution, the politics that operates in the present
highway program may reflect more the power of affected
interests than the intensity of their concern. A pressure group
such as the "highway lobby," which combines the automobile
manufacturers, the insurance industry, the horizontal construc26

"These problems are not new, of course, and a great many people have been
worrying about these or related questions in print. See, e.g., D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1969); URBAN GOVERNMENT: A READER IN ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS (E. Banfield ed. 1969); Cahn & Cahn,.The War on Poverty: A Civilian

Perspective,73 YALE LJ. 1317 (1964); Jowell, The Limits of the Public Hearingas a Tool of
Urban Planning,21 AD. L. REV. 123 (1969); Note, Citizen Participationin Urban Renewa4 66
COLUM. L. REV. 485 (1966); Symposium, Planningand Citizen Participation,35 J. AM. INST.
PL.215-63
(1969).
227See, e.g.,J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
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tion industry and the truckers, does have some inherent
advantages over loosely organized coalitions of environmental
and consumer groups. What follows explores devices that
promise to eliminate this imbalance in the present representation
of interests and at the same time avoid the pitfalls of majoritarian
democracy.
(i)

Weighted Participation

There are several techniques by which affected interests
which are thought to be "underrepresented" may be "enfranchised" for purposes of public decisionmaking. One method is to
weight the participation of particular groups that are thought to
have interests requiring special protection. This weighting may
be accomplished by the manipulation of the criteria which guide
administrative action. We have seen two somewhat different
examples of this type of weighting in the highway program. The
first is the leverage provided to groups with interests in the
preservation of parklands by the very strict "no feasible or
prudent alternative" standard which governs the taking of park
properties for highway purposes. 228 A second example is the
relocation guarantee provided to persons who lose their
229
residences or places of business to highway construction.
Presumably, the requirement that the highway planner not only
consider the dislocatees' costs but actually pay them will force
the decisionmakers to give more weight to the interests of the
homeowner and shopowner.
The experience with weighting devices in the highway
program, however, suggests that they are not without difficulties.
Numerous reports attest to the failure of the relocation
guarantees to provide an effective voice or effective compensation to those displaced. 230 The failure seems to be traceable to the
high incidence of road building in relatively impoverished areas
and areas of minority group concentration. The park protectionists are doubtless doing better. Because they are likely to
have the human and economic resources necessary to make
effective use of the statutory lever, weighted participation is for
them an effective device. But, of course, to the extent that they
2 28

Seetext accompanying notes 157-76 supra.
229See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra
23See, e.g., Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief 57 VA. L. REv. 745

(1971).
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are effective in diverting road building from parklands, they will
put increased pressure on alternate land uses-that is, houses and
shops-and on the class of potential displacees. Thus, in
attempting to weight the interests of more than one group the
federal-aid legislation may end up simply taking away with the
left hand what was given with the right. And, of course, any
particular scheme for the weighting of votes is always subject to
the criticism of those whose priorities differ or who disagree
about the facts or both, and who therefore would allocate the
counters differently. In short, scale balancing by means of
weighted participation may be useful; but the effects of
weighting on the relative status of other interests may be difficult
to foresee or control, and in any event a weighting scheme may
not increase the sense of the legitimacy of any agency's decision
among interested parties.
(ii) Judicialization
An alternative means of increasing the effective participation of groups that are currently thought to be underrepresented
in the decision process is to change the decisional context. This
technique is often combined with such elements of democratic
morality as "openness" and "accountability" to produce general
reforms in public hearing processes and other formal aspects of
administrative decisionmaking. The general idea is to bring
decisionmaking out of the cloakrooms, agency offices and other
haunts of "special interest" groups and into a forum where all
may participate equally.
Experience in the highway program and elsewhere suggests
that this sort of procedural reform will not produce any
substantial realignment of power, unless it goes beyond providing for public investigative or informational hearings. For, if
democratization means providing meaningful participation in
public decisionmaking through the use of an open forum, then
that right to participation must be structured in such a fashion
that it may be made effective when exercised and is protected
against end runs by opposing interests with special access to the
decisionmakers. The progressive logic of this type of reformist
approach leads almost inevitably in the direction of an increased
"judicialization" of the decision process.
In the highway context, numerous proposals have been
made to amend the public hearing requirements of section 128 of
title 23 to make those hearings approximate an adversary
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process. 231 For example, the highway opponent's limited access
to technical irformation might be broadened by providing for
cross-examination of highway department personnel in public
hearings. The decisionmaker's supposed lack of responsiveness
to citizen complaints and submissions might be relmedied by a
requirement that the ultimate decision be reasoned and explicitly responsive to the issues ventilated at the hearing. Indeed,
if one were really serious about avoiding undisclosed special
interest pleading and low visibility decisionmaking in accordance with the conventional wisdom of dominant groups, the
whole panoply of adjudicatory hearing rights embodied in
sections 7 and 8 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act
might be adopted.
The desirability of such a radical reorientation of the
existing decision process is doubtful particularly in light of less
drastic (and less costly) measures available to secure essentially
the same goals. Better information may be supplied to interested
parties and comprehensible procedures for citizen complaints
may be established without resorting to highly judicialized
procedure. A well-publicized complaint procedure would contribute to a feeling on the part of the affected public that its
grievances and submissions were being fairly and seriously
treated, without the need for formal hearings. Highway
decisionmakers could do a much better job than they do now of
informing the public of their plans, explicating the operative
criteria for judgment and the basis for their decisions, and
making this information available when it would be useful to
participants in the public hearings or the complaints process.
These fairly limited proposals have been elaborated at some
length elsewhere. 232 When integrated with a provision such as
the 1970 Federal Aid Highways Act's amendment of section 128
of title 23, which requires a statement from the decisionmaker
certifying his attention to a range of specific factors, these
reforms in administrative practice would seem to be about as far
as "procedural reform" should be carried in the attempt to make
transportation decisionmaking more open and explicitly responsive to all affected interests.
This conclusion is supported by the unlikelihood that much
would be gained by further moves in the direction of judicializa231See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 38973-74 (1970) (amendments offered by
Congressman
Reid)2See Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid
Programs:Suggestionsfor BeneficiaryInvolvemen 58 VA. L. REV. 600 (1972).
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tion. Although this is not the place for extensive analysis of the
use and abuse of adjudicatory process in administrative decisionmaking, 233 two rather fundamental points may be made in this
connection. First, adjudicatory procedure will not produce a
significant increase in the perceived legitimacy of decisions
unless there are reasonably well-understood principles upon
which such decisions may be logically explained. The fact that a
decisionmaker has been required to listen to the submissions of
all affected parties and to make a decision exclusively on the
record compiled at a formal hearing will not necessarily make
the losing parties feel that their participation in the decision
process was meaningful, if in the final analysis the decider can
only say that he thought the interests or values represented by
someone else were more important. When the decision to be
made is whether to build a particular transportation facility,
consideringall the relevant economic, social and environmentaleffects of
that decision, there is simply no technique for logical deduction
from common premises to ultimate conclusions. Opposition to
freeways on the ground that they contribute to urban sprawl
confronts the Federal Highway Administrator's statement, "I
love urban sprawl, and so do most of my best friends,' 234 with no
clear guidelines concerning whose preferences are to be
preferred.
Second, if the long experience of federal regulatory agencies
is taken as the model ofjudicialized administrative decisionmaking, we should also be wary of the notion that judicialization will
necessarily provide a more explicit and consistent articulation of
the values that are in fact being favored. A major and persistent
criticism of the "independent regulatory commission" has been
its failure to enunciate and follow clear policies. 23 5 I would

suggest that this is not a failure which can be traced to the
organization of the independent regulatory commissions or to
any laxness in their use of quasi-judicial procedure. 23 6 Rather, it
results from assigning them the job of rational determination of
the public interest. That job cannot be done. Forcing the task into
the adjudicatory mold, including the requirement of reasoned
23 3

See, e.g., Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227 (1966);
Robinson, The Making ofAdministrativePolicy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication
andAdministrative
ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970).
23
4. BURBY, supranote 73, at 296.
23. See, e.g., Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE
2 36L.J. 931,939 (1960).
See Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV.
947 (1971).
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decisionmaking, merely ensures that the agency will appear
inarticulate or arbitrary as it struggles to deal with the complex,
shifting and sometimes inconsistent set of values which are
relevant to its decisions.
Hence, it is not possible to predict whether any presently
disenfranchised groups would find their interests better protected by the rigorous equality of participation normally
associated with adjudicatory processes. Moreover, it is highly
unrealistic to assume that access to an adjudicatory process
would really be easier for many affected interests. If "judicialization" of transportation decisions were marked by the same
formality, delay and cost which pervade the quasi-judicial
regulatory process, it seems doubtful that the cast of characters
who have a real voice in policymaking would change significantly.
To be sure, the antihighway participant with significant
resources would gain the leverage available to anyone who
wishes to delay decisionmaking in a highly formalized and
essentially open-ended procedural system. But such participants
are not likely to appear with any frequency, and their impact will
be lessened by the staying power of producer interests.
Moreover, the more judicialized the procedure becomes, the
more appropriate it will be to give the citizen a single shot at
making his case in the hearing. Hence, a major value to the lay
participant may be lost: his ability under the present system to
use hearings as a focal point for organizing a citizens' group to
engage in a continuing dialogue with the state highway
department, FHWA, or elected officials. In short, depoliticizing
the decision process is not likely to be useful to the presently
powerless unless decisional criteria which will tend to produce
results in accordance with their value orderings can be supplied
to the decisionmaker. But, of course, if we already knew what
results we wanted, that is, results that accord with the wishes of
particular groups or which respond exclusively to particular
rather than to multiple values, we would not need any reforms in
the decision process for arriving at public choices concerning
highways or other public investments.
(iii)

Planning with People

We have previously mentioned another variation on
"democratization" or "participatory democracy," the so-called
"planning with people" approach. There are quite a number of
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variations on this theme," 3' but the core idea is to provide a
decisional structure which allocates some power to lay participants who are directly affected by the public project or program
involved. Citizen participation in planning which relies wholly
on persuasion through guaranteed access to the public decision238
maker is usually considered a form of "planning with people,"
but that model is so little removed from the traditional
administrative decision after an informal public hearing that we
need not be concerned with it here. The comments which follow
refer rather to citizen participation which includes some
decisional authority, through participation either in the decisional body or in a parallel, lay organization which has the power
to approve or disapprove some parts or all of any proposed
action.
This is an approach which avoids the pitfalls of the excessive
formalization and unsuccessful depoliticization which attend the
"judicialized" model of guaranteed participation. The framework for decisionmaking may remain fluid and essentially
managerial. The idea is simply to put people with different
interests and perspectives in a position to share decisional power
with the agency professionals. Unless one is peculiarly susceptible to administrative claims of competence and rational pursuit
of the public interest, planning with people sounds like a
worthwhile idea. But like all strategies for producing acceptable
public choice, it has its problems.
There is first the problem of choosing those citizens, and
hence those interests, who will be included in this special form of
participation. As experience with OEO Community Action
Agencies has revealed, selection may involve the creation of an
entirely new political process which turns out to have many of
the same difficulties of the old one. Second, the planning that is
to be done with the people is not to be carried on in a vacuum. A
particular public agency's mission, its resources, its professional
bias and its political prognostications are ever-present
factors;
239
they all diminish the effectiveness of lay participation.
23 7

The Public AdministrationReview has been virtually filled with articles on various
aspects of "citizen participation" over the past few years. See, e.g., Citizens Action in Model
Cities and CAP Programs:Case Studies and Evaluation, 32 PUB.AD. REV. 337-470 (1972);
Curriculum Essays on Citizens, Politics and Administration in Urban Neighborhoods,32 PUB.
AD.REV.565-738
(1972).
23 5
For a description of this approach as applied to highway planning, see
Memorandum from Kent R. Larrabee, ACSW Environmental Development Division,
U.S. 2Bureau
of Public Roads, 116 CONG.REc.38993-96 (1970).
39
See, e.g., Borton & Warner, Involving Citizens in Water Resources Planning, 3
ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 284 (197 1).
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There is finally the problem of the scale or dimension of
issues. This problem is particularly troublesome when attempting to "democratize" transportation decisionmaking. Planning
with people suggests a decentralization of decisionmaking which
will make intense participation by affected parties feasible. But
the same sort of participation made available to those interested
in a neighborhood park, or the policies of the precinct police
station, cannot be made available in the planning of the state's
arterial road network or of a metropolitan subway system. By the
ti,,ae a transportation project gets down to a scale where the most
directly affected populace can be identified, the basic decisions
have usually been made. Citizen participation of a significant
sort may yet be had on some questions of location and design,
but the big, systemic issues of need and choice of mode cannot as
a matter of formal policy be kept open at the project design
stage. And any attempt to organize citizen participation at a level
which deals with these broader issues will almost necessarily
simply replicate the existing structure of representative government.240 If that structure is not presently operating on the basis of

acceptable criteria for public choice about the transportation
system, a different set of decisionmakers elected in the same
fashion from among the same populace will not guarantee
improvement.
c. Summary
The blend of "rational planning" and "public participation"
with centralized administrative responsibility represented by the
decision process under the current federal-aid highway legislation appears, if not judicious, at least not wholly wrongheaded
when the implications of increased emphasis on either "rationality" or "democratization" in transportation decisionmaking are briefly explored. Either of these approaches, if not
combined with the other, turns fairly quickly into a theoretical or
an operational cul-de-sac, and while reasonable men might differ
about where the appropriate balance should be struck, it seems
clear that no organizational solution promises more than some
tinkering with the management of conflict about transportation
policy. Although certain decisional processes may further one
interest or value as against another, there seems to be little
240

Cf Graves, Citizen Participation in Metropolitan Planning, 32 PUB. AD. REV. 198

(1972).
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prospect that any change in the process of decision can be
justified as self-evidently promoting "better" decisions. Whether
the decisions are likely to be "better" depends largely upon one's
preferences and whether those preferences tend to be supported
by the new decision process.
There is, however, a system for making decisions about the
allocation of resources to the production of transportation goods
and services which has not been discussed. It is a system which
has been explicitly rejected as a part of federal highway policy
and plays a very limited part in state and local transportation
policies. That system is the "price" or "market" system. Without
seeming to offer pricing as a panacea for the ills of public
decisionmaking about transportation, it shall be the purpose of
the remainder of this Article to argue for the introduction of
pricing strategies into the process of public decisionmaking
about transportation expenditures. While the details of pricing
particular road uses cannot be developed here, the general
feasibility and desirability of pricing road use will be explored.
2.

Pricing

Pricing solutions to the problem of determining when the
public interest is served by road building are almost never
proposed by the present coalition of antihighway reformers. This
is understandable. The interests involved march under banners
such as low-income housing, the environment, and "rational"
(read "aesthetically pleasing to the upper middle class") urban
planning. These are not causes which "market allocation" is
thought to promote. It is perhaps for this reason that there has
been little public discussion of the pricing of road use in this
country and little attention outside the technical literature to the
impact of making road investment decisions on the basis of an
efficiency standard. Hence there may seem to be some irony in
the suggestion that the .solution to the problems of the
antihighway environmentalist or protector of low-income housing may lie in creating a marketplace for roads. Nevertheless,
there is clearly something to the notion that the introduction of
full cost pricing of roads would both cut down highway
construction 24 1 and provide a process for making decisions about
24 1

This results from the decreasing net benefits of road construction once prices are
imposed and the level of congestion is reduced. New construction will then produce a
smaller increase in flow than when added to a road system using zero pricing. See
Thompson, Some Aspects of Evaluating Road Improvements in Congested Areas, 38
ECONOMETRICA 298 (1970).
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highway investment which (1) substitutes "efficiency" for the
presently vague standard of highway "needs" and (2) substitutes
the market mechanism for the current complexities of administrative investment decisions.
By an "efficiency standard" is meant simply that money for
the construction and maintenance of a highway facility will be
spent only if the total price that prospective users would be
willing to pay for its use equals or exceeds total construction and
maintenance costs. Of course, the choice of this standard does
not, as a theoretical matter, dictate a pricing scheme. The same
standard might be employed by the comprehensive transportation planners under section 134, for instance, in place of the
vague "goals" which planners now pursue.242 In deciding to
recommend a new addition, planners might balance cost
estimates against what an informed guess told them prospective
users "would be willing to pay." The practical problem is,
however, that unless some pricing is done, reliable information
about preferences is never forthcoming, and the efficiency
standard becomes a sham. Thus, the premise of the discussion
which follows is that, to some extent at least, the operation of the
efficiency criterion requires that road use be marketed in the
general economy along with all other goods and services, and
that the road builder operate under the usual market constraints-including sufficient profitability to attract capital.
Because this proposal involves a rather radical reorientation
of our thinking about transportation policymaking, it might be
useful to develop a limited model of how decisionmaking
concerning transportation investments might operate under such
a pricing system. Let us imagine a small city with an existing
street system laid out in a grid pattern. Major highways run both
north-south and east-west through the city. Congestion is
inc-reasing on these highways, on major streets and in the
downtown area. A proposal is made to widen the major
thoroughfares and/or to build a limited-access circumferential
route around the city. Objections are immediately raised to both
plans by various affected groups and the city council is urged to
look into alternative modes of transportation. Thus far the
scenario is not unfamiliar.
However, our hypothetical city, call it Smithville, has a
rather bizarre approach to transportation policy. It provides only
those transportation facilities that can be paid for out of charges
242

Seetext following note 94 supra.
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to users, and is currently charging users the full costs of the
existing transportation system. Hence the city council begins its
deliberations by estimating the construction and maintenance
costs of the various alternatives and comparing those costs with
the estimated revenues that can be generated by each project.
Included in Smithville's cost estimates should be not only direct
costs but also any indirect costs, e.g., traffic or air pollution
control, that it will have to bear because of the new facility.
Should these figures be negative they would then be included in
the revenue estimates along with such items as tolls or special
license fees that might be collected on the limited-access road,
increases in general permit or license fees that might be made for
use of improved or expanded facilities, and payments by
abutting landowners to induce the city to increase access to their
premises. If total revenues 6xceed total costs, the project is
worthwhile. Should projects be mutually exclusive, that project
or combination which maximizes the city's return will be chosen.
In considering the design of the various facilities the
Smithville City Council maximizes its returns for each project
by trading off conflicting preferences, for example, the desires of
through traffic for limited access against the desires of adjacent
property owners for easy access, or the desires of some motorists
and shopowners for on-street parking against the desire of other
motorists for decreased congestion, through the price mechanism. If landowners and shopowners are willing to pay more for
easy access and adjacent on-street parking than motorists are
willing to pay for decreased congestion and travel time, the
desires of the former are honored. Similarly, if the city can buy
and operate additional buses at a return which is greater than
that which is estimated to result from increasing street capacity,
it will choose to provide transportation service in the form of
additional bus routes rather than in additional streets. In
determining total revenues from buses, Smithville will, of
course, take into account losses from automobile permit fees and
parking charges that result from increased bus ridership, as well
as gains that might result from subsidies to the bus service by
merchants and increases in automobile permit rates made
possible by decreasing congestion.
This is a rather sketchy model but it should be sufficient to
convey the general idea and to allow discussion of a series of
problems with road pricing schemes. Some of the objections are
not very serious, and these will be discussed first. We shall then
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take up some rather more difficult theoretical and practical
issues.
a.

Common Objections to Road Pricing

Initially, there is the question of whether the "efficiency"
standard is appropriate. There are perhaps two arguments
lurking here. The first is that because of various types of market
failure, pricing in a wholly free market does not reflect the real
social costs of activities. Therefore, the social benefits from
employing the efficiency standard are illusory; resources are not
necessarily going to their highest value uses. The second is that
the efficiency standard ignores the income distribution consequences of resource allocations by means of pricing. Both of
these arguments have considerable force in other contexts, but
they have a limited application to the pricing of road use.
The objection on allocational grounds must contend with an
existing state of affairs in which virtually none of the negative
externalities of road use (e.g., congestion, pollution, community
disruption, court and police costs) are borne directly by the road
user. All proposals for road user charges internalize at least some
of these costs and are to that degree superior on social
accounting grounds to the present system of road planning
which attempts to meet "all [current and] projected travel
demands" 243 untroubled by cost. The objection on the basis of
distributional effects would have to make a case that "free roads"
contribute to "equitable" income distribution. But when only
slightly more than one-half of poor families 244 have access to
automobiles, a means of transport from which the nonpoor aged,
young and disabled are also often excluded; and when the
negative impacts of urban highways seem to fall disproportionately on poor people, 21 that case begins to be very hard to
make. There may in fact be very large wealth transfers from
24

3See Smith, Purpose and Conduct of Transportation Studies, in INSTITUTE OF CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS OF THETRANSPORT ENGINEERING CONFERENCE (1965).
ENGINEERS,
2 44
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD OWNERSHIP AND

at 65 (1967). The McCone Commission found that
only 14% of Watts' families owned cars at the time of the Watts riots and that the lack of
transportation to commute to work or even to seek work was considered a major factor in
the frustrations of the ghetto residents. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE Los
PURCHASE OF DURABLES, 1960-67,

ANGELES
24 5 RIOTs, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING 65-68 (1965).

- These negative impacts include both loss of housing and neighborhood amenities,
seeHartman, Relocation: Illusory PromisesandJNo Relief 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (197 1), and the
acceleration of urban land use patterns which make the transportation problems of the
poor more acute. See O.ORNATI, TRANSPORTATION NEEDS OF THE POOR (1969).
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poor to rich under the present system. Perhaps the best that can
be hazarded is that it is likely to be very difficult to predict where
the gains and losses will fall among the populace should road
pricing be introduced.246 Hence, while "efficiency" as a decision
rule with market pricing as its concomitant decision process may
be vulnerable to some degree from both allocational and
distributional perspectives, it seems unlikely that present need
criteria and decision processes are less vulnerable.
A second obstacle to the pricing of road use is technical or
technological. Tolls on expressways or bridges are clearly
feasible, but urban streets and country roads are a different
matter. At base the issue here is how fine-grained the pricing
mechanism must be in order for pricing to play a useful role in
resource allocation decisions. If we are satisfied with nothing less
than charges which reflect the true social (including congestion)
costs of each car's impact on a stream of traffic, then the battle is
lost. On the other hand, if we can be satisfied with something less
than perfect pricing, a mixture of tolls, restricted licenses, land
taxes, parking charges and variable fuel taxes will do a fair job of
making and collecting charges for road use. 24 7 After all, we can
24

6SeeA. WALTERS, THE ECONOMICS OF ROAD USER CHARGES 237-40 (1968).
See generally GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, ROAD PRICING, THE
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES (1964); G. ROTH, PAYING FOR ROADS (1967);
2 47

A. WALTERS, supra note 246.
Fuel taxes measure the amount of fuel consumed. The obvious difficulty with these
taxes is their failure to ration use of roads at the margin. That is, except to the slight
extent that travel on congested roads requires more fuel, payment of fuel taxes does not
ration use of congested roads more than uncongested roads. Hence the tax can indicate at
best how much roadway can be financed, not where to put it and who should use it.
Balanced against the misallocation of highway resources which the fuel tax scheme leaves
room for is the ease of collection.
Parking charges measure the amount of time and space consumed in parking. An
obvious limitation of parking charges is their inability to tax road users who only pass
through a congested area and do not park. Hence, they must be used along with other
pricing techniques. Another possible disadvantage is the way in which parking charges
based on time can operate to increase congestion by promoting a more rapid turnover of
cars. Nevertheless, to the extent that parking charges which reflect the real costs of street
use in particular areas would deter motorists from driving and encourage transfer to
public transport or fringe parking, these charges would be beneficial in allocating
resources to higher value users. Also, downtown merchants, as nonuser beneficiaries of
parking on public streets, might bear some of the burden of parking charges by validating
parking tickets. In this way the value to abutting landowners of customer parking on
public property could be collected and the parking charges would function in a manner
similar to land taxes.
Special land taxes can be used to charge for the benefits to land owners which result
from nearby servicing roads or roads in general. Like all charges for the use of roads
these taxes should tend to allocate the use of land to its highest value use- roads or
something else. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?)IlJ.L. & ECON. 55, 62 (1968). Since
the right to use publicly owned land by deriving benefits from proximity to it is a right to
use a scarce resource, the absence of a price for this use that reflects the opportunity costs
of alternative uses will lead to overutilization. However, there are both theoretical and
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seldom find a real-world example of pricing which takes account
of all external costs and benefits. And in an imperfect market any
movement toward pricing is subject to the objection that it can
never, or only under exceptional circumstances, yield unambiguous information on whether a gain in allocational efficiency
has been achieved. Thus, although the technical problems of
pricing road use are not insignificant, one can certainly argue on
the strength of our tolerance of imperfect pricing in other areas,
despite this objection, that we should be satisfied with something
less than perfect pricing in transportation decisionmaking.
Whether to use the pricing mechanism should always be a
question of its relative usefulness and costliness as compared
with alternative means of generating information and making
decisions. We shall return to this comparison below.
A third common objection is that we already know how
much public investment in roads is desired by the populace,
because the road system is self-financed by the users. This is an
ubiquitous refrain in government and highway building circles.
The statement is so transparently false that its continued vitality
can only be attributed to a misperception of the implications of
its denial. One need not claim that the present tax system for
raising highway revenues produces no information concerning
empirical difficulties with setting taxes to measure the benefit to abutting landowners.
Not only is this tax bound to be empirically imprecise, but it must also contend with a
reciprocity problem: just as the roadway influences the value of the land, the land use
influences the value of the roadway.
The sale of restricted licenses and permits is a fairly straightforward way to
determine who shall use certain roads at certain times. Although somewhat cumbersome
if too many categories of permits are used, this has proved workable in allocating space to
stationary vehicles and could be used for moving vehicles as well. The allocation of
permits by the market place would be theoretically acceptable, although G. ROTH, supra,
is troubled by the emergence of a black market in permits. Since such a black market
would allocate the permits to those users who placed the highest value on road travel, I
am not certain why we should be concerned by this problem, at least in the short run. But
the free exchange of permits outside a publicly controlled market might obscure some
demand signals and hence skew public investment policy.
Tolls may offer the .most direct means of charging the marginal social cost imposed
by each additional motorist. If transactions were costless, some higher value users could
be expected to pay some lower value users to stay off the roads, or at least certain roads at
certain times. But organizing these transactions would, in fact, be prohibitively costly.
Obviously a toll which included an amount for congestion costs imposed on others would
serve as a less costly substitute for private transactions between rush-hour motorists, and
hence as a means for compelling each user to "pay his own way." The practical
difficulties of determining congestion costs have led some to despair of the effective use of
tolls, see, e.g., Sherman, Subsidies to Relieve Urban Traffic Congestion, 6J. TRANSPORT ECON.
&POLICY 22 (1972). Others are more sanguine about this mechanism for charging road
users. See G. ROTH, supra, ch. 5 (discussing various technologies for recording and
computing tolls on cars and for measuring either time spent in each congestion zone or
miles traveled in various zones). See alsoVickrey, Pricing in Urbanand Suburban Transport,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 452 (1963).
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the public's demand for highways to deny that the information
produced is worth very much as an indicator of allocational
efficiency. Although the tax is incurred as a part of a voluntary
exchange for gasoline or tires, there is considerable difficulty in
saying that the involuntary portion of the price is an accurate
reflection of the purchasers' aggregate demand for highwayseven given the admittedly close relationship between the
demand for the product which is purchased and the product
which is "tied" to its sale. By the simple expedient of changing
the size of his vehicle the purchaser can enormously increase or
decrease his use (in vehicle miles per year) of highways without
altering his tax payments. More importantly, the collected
revenues may be spent virtually anywhere in the highway system
and therefore give little information concerning where the
purchasers want the highways built.24 Finally, the inability of
the taxing system to differentiate between peak and off-peak
users, for example, prevents short run allocation of existing
highway resources to their highest valued users. In economists'
terms, it is an "average" rather than "marginal" cost pricing
scheme.
This is not, of course, to say that the gasoline tax must be
abandoned as a part of any system of user charges. It is to say
only that the present tax financing system gives very fuzzy
signals concerning consumer preferences, and therefore inadequate information to guide and evaluate specific investment
decisions.
There has also been some opposition to the notion that
marginal cost pricing of road use really involves pricing in any
usual sense of that term. The argument is that in most road
pricing schemes the addition to each motorist's bill of the
congestion costs that his road use imposes on other users
includes costs which are ignored in the market pricing of other
goods.24 9 Presumably this limits the utility of road pricing in
achieving allocational efficiency. This objection is theoretically
untenable, however. It seems clear that a profit-seeking seller of
road space desiring to maximize passenger-car-miles per hour
should indeed consider congestion costs in his pricing and
thereby internalize them,2 5 ° in the same way that Smithville
24 8
See Milliman, Beneficiary Charges and Efficient Public Expenditure Decisions, in 1
ANALYSIS
OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, supranote 72 at 291, 298.
24 9
Sharp, Co yestion and Welfare - A n Examinationof the Casefor a Congestion Tax, 76
ECON.ae.
806
21OMoore,
Congestion and Welfare - Comment, 78 ECON.J. 157 (1966).
(1968).
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considered competing use demands in our previous example.
Moreover, all systems for pricing road use need not attempt to
charge for congestion costs explicitly. Congestion costs are not a
problem, for example, where the total social costs of providing
and maintaining a road facility are charged to the users, as in our
Smithville example. Persons wishing to reduce congestion will
simply bid additional resources into the provision of transportation goods and services.
Congestion costs do seem to require explicit treatment,
however, in pricing schemes which, unlike the Smithville
system, do not charge users for long-run or total marginal costs.
And it may be argued that Smithville has avoided the congestion
charge problem through the introduction of long-run marginal
cost pricing which produces serious allocational inefficiency.
This and several other troubleome but less pervasive objections
constitute a serious threat to the viability of the Smithville
system.
b.

Some More Serious Issues

(i)

The "Marginal Cost" Debate

Everyone seems to agree that for purposes of promoting
allocational efficiency the appropriate price to be charged for any
particular use of a transportation facility is the marginal cost of
that use. Disagreement breaks out, however, concerning what
should be included in marginal cost when indivisibilities on the
supply side point toward different pricing policies for shortrun as
against longrun efficiency. The issue may be illuminated by an
analysis of two schools of thought which have emerged in the
1
25

literature.

The first school has as its fundamental tenet the necessity of
ignoring construction and invariate maintenance costs when
pricing the use of roads. According to this view any charge above
shortrun marginal costs, that is, maintenance costs which vary
with use 252 and congestion costs, necessarily results in an
underutilization of road resources once in place. Trips will be
foregone which have a value to road users which is greater than
".lSeeCoase, The Theory ofPublic Utility Pricingand Its Application, 1 BELLJ. ECON.&
MGT. Sci. 113 (1970) & sources cited.

152We can without distortion include institutional requirements for a road system,
for example, police and courts, within this heading.
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the marginal social cost of the trips because the price charged
includes a sum for the sunk, irretrievable and therefore
currently
253
irrelevant costs of building the road in the first place.
The archetypical case is the situation in which shortrun
marginal costs are zero. Let us consider, for example, a road with
only one potential user. We assume that there is no congestion
and no measurable impact of use on maintenance, that the road
costs $100 per year to construct and maintain andthat we intend
to collect the cost from the user. If the user's demand for trips is
like that represented in Figure 1,254 the pricing policy of a state
following the Smithville plan will be to charge a toll of between
$.20 and $1.00. But charging a toll of $.20 will eliminate 500
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trips per year whose value would be greater than their marginal
social cost-in efficiency terms, socially desirable trips. On the
strength of this insight alone a state might reasonably choose to
charge the user nothing, even though this strategy meant the
failure to recoup its initial investment.
The implications of this analysis for the use of pricing as a
means of allocating resources to transportation uses are significant. If efficient allocation of existing facilities requires that
prices be limited to shortrun marginal costs, no information will
be generated about the willingness of users to pay the total costs
of the facility. Hence the pricing system cannot be used as a basis
for decisions about the construction or provision of transportation facilities.
But even if this analysis is correct, and I shall argue shortly
that it is not, it does not dispose of the case for making user
charges equal to shortrun marginal costs. In actual situations
these costs will be a positive figure, although they were assumed
to be zero in the previous example. And there seems to be no
reason, a priori, to eschew the rationing of existing facilities that
may be accomplished by charging users the marginal costs of
their use.
Under such a system of charges, decisions about further
investments in transportation goods and services could be
approached on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis which
measures benefits by the creation of consumer surplus, which
may be defined for present purposes as the value of new
transportation facilities over and above the price which is paid to
use them. In short form, the principle is that if the demand for
highways is presumed to increase independently of their
supply, 55 then within certain limitations, additions to the road
supply will generate greater consumer surplus than would be
produced by holding supply constant in the face of increasing
demand. This can be represented graphically as in Figure 2,
where initial demand and supply are represented by D1 and S1
respectively. As demand increases to D2 , the price per mile of
road use will increase in the absence of expanded capacity. If
new facilities alter the supply curve to S 2 , however, the price per
2 5 VWhile I shall not at this point contest this proposition, there seem strong reasons

to believe that the building or improvement of highways has long run effects on the slope
of the demand curve for road use. Contrary to the usual case this "canting" of demand
may be in the direction of long run inelasticity. See, e.g., Nelson, Policy Analysis in
TransportationPrograms,in 3 ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, supra note 72, at 1102,
1110-11 (1969).
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mile drops from A to B while the flow of traffic increases from M
to N. The consumer surplus generated by the new facility is the
amount by which the estimated total which its users would be
willing to pay for its use (P 3 P 4 MN) exceeds what those users do
figure. 25"6
in fact pay (XP 4 MN). This appears as P3 X P 4 in the
of the size
Alternative projects may then be judged on the basis
257
produce.
would
they
which
of the consumer surplus

M

N

Flow
(Car-Miles per Hour)
FIGuRE
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Thompson, Some Aspects of Evaluating Road Improvements in Congested Areas, 38
298 (1970).
ECONOMETRICA
25 7
This sort of analysis is indeed an improvement over the cost-benefit analyses
which commonly are used for purposes of determining public expenditure policy. It at
least does not assume that all the flow on the new facility (P ) would have been
accommodated on the old at the increased price (P.). See Margolis, Shadow Prices for
Incorrect or Non-Existent Market Values, in ANALYSIS OF PUBLIc EXPENDITURE, supra note
72, at 533, 543-44.
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A slightly different and more detailed application of this
approach by Walters 58 views the question of public benefit from
the perspective of optimum, short term marginal pricing, taking
into account that the total social costs of the use of a road,
including costs of congestion, may at some point increase while
mobility is decreasing. This jump in costs occurs because on a
given length of roadway the total number of trips per day will
increase with increasing congestion only up to a certain critical
number of vehicles. Past that point the addition of vehicles to the
stream of traffic reduces not only the average number of trips per
vehicle but also the total number of vehicle trips that will be
completed. At the point where adding vehicles reduces total
trips, society is incurring increasing total costs for decreasing
total returns. Employing this phenomenon Walters posits the
road capacity for an existing facility as the point at which the cost
curve becomes backward-bending. This point is represented by
Q in Figure 3. The optimum pricing policy is that which
balances demand and supply at road capacity. Hence in Figure 3
the user charges should be a congestion, really a "capacity,"
charge set at OR minus OH and a maintenance charge of OA,
where DD describes the demand and OH minus OA the users'
operating costs. Again, whether this facility should be built
depends on whether construction and invariate maintenance
costs are exceeded by consumer surplus, RDP. 25 9 Of course, if

the demand fell to D'D', no congestion charge would be levied,
and the benefit for comparative purposes would be HD' Z.
While the Walters analysis makes a reasonably strong case
for the imposition of user charges, including charges to cover
congestion costs, the problem with this or any cost-benefit
approach is that the consumer surplus-opportunity cost comparison reveals nothing about the optimum long term allocation of
resources. It assumes that the lumping together of these
resources in a road necessarily produces a consumer surplus
greater than the surplus produced by their utilization elsewhere
in the economy. The assumption is valid only if the resources
employed would, if released, be dispersed to marginal units of
production elsewhere whose value was no greater than cost.26 0
2"A. WALTERS, supra note 246.
259Actually Walters is using this model to deal with the question of whether to
continue operating an existing facility. I think, however, he is including rent in invariate

costs2 and
hence the analysis should hold for a prospective facility.
60
See 1 TECHNIQUES OF TRANSPORT PLANNING 190-91 (J. Meyer ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as TRANSPORT PLANNING].
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This condition might obtain under ideal circumstances, for if
higher value uses existed, in the private sector at least, the
resources would be appropriated to those uses by profit-seekers.
But if there were any possibility of lumpiness or specialization in
the resources which would inhibit their dispersion, the assumption is no longer warranted. Only a full evaluation of the
consumer surplus produced by all available alternative uses
would justify the conclusion that the use of material, machinery
and manpower in the road was the highest value use to which
they could be put. Since it is generally recognized that the heavy
construction industry is divided into somewhat specialized
horizontal and vertical segments, our confidence that a positive
cost-benefit ratio reveals an efficient allocation of resources is
stretched very thin. 26 1 When we add to this source of concern the
empirical difficulties of describing a demand curve in the absence
of historical data on the fluctuation of demand with changes in

Q
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,See generally, R.
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price, and the theoretical problems of an appropriate discount
rate, we may well wonder whether
the simple finding of a net
26 2
benefit or deficit is at all reliable.
The Walters pricing scheme suffers from the additional
failing that it does not necessarily allocate existing facilities to
their highest value users and thus may fail to maximize the total
benefit to society. Each vehicle trip seems on his analysis to be
considered as precisely equal in value to every other trip. Hence
the choice of the point Q, where total trips begin to decrease, as
descriptive of the capacity of the road, and the use of a
congestion charge to maintain the number of vehicles at Q.
However, if we assume that certain users' trips are more valuable
than others' (because they are willing to pay a higher price to
make the trips), the total social product from vehicle trips may
decrease while total trips are still increasing.
To take a simple example, assume that motorists A and B
wish to use the same road. A's trip is worth $100 and B's is worth
$20. If A had the highway to himself, he could make one trip per
day. The same is true for B. When both use the road each can
only make % of a trip. Total trips thereby increase from 1 to 1V2,
but the total social product from these trips declines from the
$100 value of A traveling alone to $90: A's % trip (at $100 per
trip) plus B's %trip (at $20 per trip).
These difficulties suggest the desirability of a pricing scheme
which seeks to recover longrun marginal costs, if such a scheme
can be employed without producing short run distortions. To
return to the example represented by Figure 1, there would
appear to be two nondistorting price solutions available. The first
is to price discriminate among trips by collecting a toll equal to
the value of each trip to the traveler and not less than the
shortrun marginal cost. In that way no charge in excess of the
marginal value of a particular trip would be imposed and hence
no socially useful trip would be deterred by a charge in excess of
its marginal cost.
Unfortunately this solution is neither feasible nor desirable.
It is impracticable because we cannot know without bargaining
what the user will be willing to pay for each particular trip, and
bargaining with each traveler about each trip is too costly under
most circumstances. It is undesirable because the ability to price
262

See generally TRANSPORT PLANNING, supra note 260, at 185-215; Baumol, On the
DiscountRate for PublicProjects, in I ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, supra note 72, at

489; Margolis, supra note 257; Nelson, supranote 255.
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discriminate presumes a monopoly power to transfer wealth,
equal to the consumer surplus under competitive conditions,
from buyers to sellers.
A second solution is more acceptable. The user could be
charged longrun costs separately from the marginal costs of any
particular trip. Thus in the case of our Figure 1 example, the
user would be charged a $100 permit fee and no tolls. Under this
pricing policy the user would pay the longrun marginal cost of
providing the road ($100) and also make all trips which have a
value to him equal to shortrun marginal cost (zero).
In fact, this pricing technique is widely used in providing
residential streets to service new housing or shopping areas, or in
making certain types of local street improvements. The access
value of these streets is, in effect, transferred along with the
abutting property, and the developer recovers his costs of
developing the street system through the sale of that property.
Hence, resources are already being allocated to certain types of
road uses through market processes. Indeed, the lump sum
payment (for a road permit or license) with no additional charge
for road use is merely a special case of two-part pricing
techniques which are well known in other contexts. The absence
of the second part of the charge in this case reflects our initial
assumption that the per-trip marginal cost is zero. If shortrun
marginal cost is greater than zero, an additional charge could be
made. With such a pricing system for public roads we would
know whether the public were willing to pay the overall cost of
constructing the road system and the variable costs of traveling
on certain segments of it.
That certain persons willing to pay shortrun but not longrun
costs will be excluded from road use by such a pricing policy
should not trouble us. The function of the pricing system is
efficient resource allocation among competing users. If pricing to
include longrun costs excludes certain classes of users from
facilities or fails to provide facilities suited to their needs, then
their preferences have been rebuffed in the marketplace for the
usual reason: they are unwilling to pay the costs associated with
their consumption. Indeed, the difference between their bids and
the higher bids of those who are willing to pay for their exclusion
represents the congestion charge which should be levied for their
use. Hence,
the private bidding eliminates the necessity for such
26 3
charges.
2 63

See Mohring, Urban Highway Investments, in MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERN-
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(ii)

Cost Allocation

There remain a series of problems, however, that would
have to be solved before one could confidently assert the
superiority of a market allocation of resources to the production
of roads, through multipart pricing, to the present political
allocation of those resources. One such problem is a more
complex formulation of the problem of allocating construction,
invariate maintenance and institutional costs-that is, costs
which do not vary with use. While a multipart pricing system
might solve part of that problem, there is yet a question of how
longrun costs should be divided among the various users or
classes of users. If a highway is provided for rush-hour and longhaul traffic, it will also be available for off-peak and local travel.
Shou'ld the latter two classes of users be charged none of the
longrun costs? If they should be charged some of those costs,
how much? If this problem cannot be solved rationally, any
system of charges may involve under- and overcharges to
various users and hence misallocations of resources.
26 4
One approach has been suggested by Harold Demsetz.
On his view the indivisibility problem, that is, the shortrun
distortion which results from allocating costs of initial production of a public good to users whose demands can be satisfied at
no additional costs, is the result of a failure to see that the good
being provided is divisible in terms of its uses to different parties.
Once that has been recognized, a quite simple joint-product
analysis will provide a pricing policy which leads to allocational
efficiency.
The elements of this analysis can be made clear through a
simple analogy to the production of beef and cowhide.
Slaughtering the animal in that case contributes as much to the
production of one good as the other; we could say that
production of one of the goods is costless. But significantly fewer
cows will be slaughtered if only one of the goods is priced. This
becomes clear from a study of Figure 4. There the cost of
slaughtering each additional cow is represented by MC and is
the same whether the cow is used for beef or hide or both. The
slaughterhouse may charge for beef or hides or both, of course,
but no matter what its policy in this regard, the total price which
MENT INVESTMENTS 231-41 (R. Dorfman ed. 1965); cf G. TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS,
PUBLICMEANS,
161-72 (1970).
264

See generallyDemsetz, PrivateProductionofPublic Goods, 13J.L. & ECON.293 (1970).
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it can expect to get for products made from each additional
animal killed must be at least equal to MC to make the extra
effort worthwhile. Thus, if only hides were priced, only the
demand for hides (DH) would be considered in setting
production levels, and the quantity of cows slaughtered would be
C. Similarly, if only beef were priced, the quantity slaughtered
would reflect only the demand for beef (DB) and would settle at
B. But if the slaughterhouse planned to charge a price for both
products, as is the likely case, demand for both items (DH+B)
would be taken into account and the number of animals killed
would rise to A. The prices charged for beef and hides would
then be P 1 and P 2 respectively, totalling the marginal costs of
slaughtering at P 3 under competitive conditions. Neither hides
nor beef could be distributed at zero price without affecting the
allocation decision of how much to produce unless meeting the
demand for the product made no contribution to covering the
marginal cost. Such a situation would exist with demand at D.l.
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In the initial case, however, production at B (or C) would result
in the loss of consumer surplus that would be generated by
production26 at
A and would therefore represent a misallocation of
5
resources.

Applying this analysis to highway pricing is relatively
straightforward. In Figure 5 MC is the opportunity cost of
providing, operating and maintaining the facility, and D1
through D4 are separable demands for highway use, for example,
off-peak auto users, peak auto users, transit users, truck users,
through traffic and local traffic. Only persons paying peak load
prices will be allowed to travel at peak times, only buyers of
truck use may use trucks and so forth. If the sum of D through
D4 exceeds MC, an addition to the facility is indicated and vice
versaDI-4
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It should be noted that this analysis treats marginal cost (MC) as constant but not
as zero; that is, it takes into account initial production costs as a part of marginal cost.
Moreover, it presumes that the jointly produced goods can be separately priced.
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Because this analysis permits zero pricing to some parties
and satisfies all demand at any price, it does not result in
underutilization of existing facilities. Moreover, it does not
ignore the fact that facilities do have opportunity costs, however
slight the cost of introducing additional users.
It may be objected that this analysis does not quite fit the
highway case or, more precisely, that it does not entirely solve
the problem of allocating the opportunity costs of highways.
Some of the demand categories just mentioned are not in fact
relevant to a joint-product solution. The separation of buyers
into peak and off-peak users would be a true joint-product
pricing strategy, because the production of capacity for peak
users would make that capacity available for off-peak users. As
with beef and hides one cannot be produced without the other,
nor can the ratio of peak to off-peak capacity be varied. But,
within either of these "noncompetitive" categories, there may be
incompatible users of highway space whose demands cannot be
summed vertically. The local bus service requires numerous
access points, safe places for discharging and taking on
passengers and a stream of traffic that is slow enough for it to
gain access to the roadway from a stop. But the crosstown
commuter traveling the same corridor in a private automobile
wants limited access and high average speed. The two-lane
blacktop road over the mountain is acceptable to the gasoline
truck, but not to the fifty cars lined up behind it. In these cases
special capacity must be built for each special demand, or
existing capacity allocated among them. If any user classification
is unwilling to pay the longrun marginal cost of providing the
facility for its needs, it will obtain no assistance from the demand
of competing users-that is, users who want to use the same
facility at the same time for incompatible purposes. Costs
incurred for the benefit of competing users are generally
denominated "common" rather than "joint" costs.
The allocation of these common costs, such as the costs of
maintaining the highway department or of constructing a
passing lane, is difficult to determine in a principled way. Indeed,
it is sometimes said that such allocations are necessarily
arbitrary, 266 and therefore produce some distortions or misallocations of resources. This may be true, but one may yet doubt
the seriousness of the difficulty. Most pricing outside the single2 6 SeeNote, The PostalReoganizationAct: A Case Study ofRegulatedIndustry Reform, 58

VA. L. REV. 1030, 1058 n. 123 (1972).
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product firm involves some "arbitrary" assignment of unallocable costs, but that does not in most cases dissuade us of the
comparative desirability of the price mechanism for making
decisions about resource allocations. Moreover, in the case of
roadways the allocation of such costs on some general basis such
as vehicle miles per year may be arbitrary, but it is hardly
nonsensical." 7 While this principle of allocation might have to
be varied or fictionalized to deal with some kinds of uses, for
example, on-street parking, a workable scheme does not seem
beyond our capacity.
(iii)

Competition

Efficient allocation of resources through pricing is generally
agreed to presume a competitive market for goods and services.
Hence the efficacy of a pricing strategy may be thought to turn
on the existence or nonexistence of competition in the relevant
market. Can such a market exist in the transportation field with
respect to major system investments such as highways? This is
hardly the place for a prolonged analysis of monopoly theory
and its application to various sorts of road investments. We shall
therefore be satisfied with a short response: perhaps not, but it is
not at all clear that we should therefore abandon attempts at
pricing roads.
First, let us address the "perhaps not" in our response. It
would appear that the provision of roads generally involves a
"natural monopoly"; that is, economies of scale will lead to the
elimination of all but one road provider in any relevant market.
If A lays a two-lane road between X and Y, and B, his
competitor, lays one beside it, it should not take A and B long to
discover that better service can be provided at lower cost and
their profits therefore enhanced-in the absence of any attempt
at monopoly pricing-by consolidating their roadways into a
four-lane divided highway or by specialization in unidirectional
travel. In either event A and B will no longer be competitors.
Moreover, if we consider the planning, regulation or marketing
of the use of city streets, there would appear to be very large
economies of scale involved in unified ownership. Thus, while
some competition among providers might occur and while there
is some intermodal competition, it does not seem likely that a
wholly private market in roads would remain any more
competitive than has the market for railroads.
267

For a more detailed exposition in a different context, see id 1065-69.
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But, to continue the prior response, lack of competition does
not necessarily preclude pricing of road facilities any more than
it suggests that railway lines should be tax-financed and free to
all users. The middle grounds of private ownership with price
and service regulation or public ownership with the requirement
that services be "non-profit" but self-financing through user
charges are often chosen when a competitive market is
unavailable and when tax-financed, "free" provision is not
justified on distributional grounds or by the inability to exclude
free-riders. Continuing the almost universal practice of public
ownership of road facilities is not inconsistent with changing the
criteria employed for public roads investments from "needs"
politically defined to "wants" established through market
pricing.
To be sure, such compromise solutions sometimes provide
weak controls over costs which reward private or public
managers at the expense of consumers. 268 But it does not seem
reasonable to suppose that a system which provided road and
other transportation services on the basis of an ability to cover
(even somewhat inflated) costs through the marketing of those
services would provide a poorer reflection of society's demand
for such services than a system, like the present one, which
determines demand on the assumption that transportation goods
and services are costless and then finances as much construction
to meet that demand as the political process determines is
appropriate. At least the proposition is not so self-evident that
experimentation with road pricing should be rejected.
(iv)

Market Failure

To return to our Smithville example: is it really possible for
a public authority to organize the pricing of road facilities in a
fashion which provides sufficiently explicit signals to guide road
investment? Or is any system of charges likely to be only a poor
reflection of demand and therefore a poor guide for public
decisionmakers? Smithville would clearly have to deal with
26 8

Strategies for the solution of this difficulty, such as annual bidding for the roads
franchise, see Demsetz, supra note 247, are of limited utility in this instance. Our interest
is in the use of market pricing to guide public investment decisions. Giving the roads
franchise to the party which promises to operate the road network at the lowest level of
charges to users deals only with the issue of preventing capture of consumer surplus
through monopolistic pricing.
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several types of "market failure" which might distort its
information and therefore its judgments.
First, Smithville should know that no pricing strategy will
internalize all the externalities-both positive and negative-of
highway travel. It could charge part of the costs of air pollution
abatement against the roads budget, for example, but abatement
costs do not necessarily represent the real social costs of
achieving a particular level of air quality. Nor does taxing part of
the costs of a new road facility against an abutting or nearby
owner necessarily collect from him either what he would have
paid to have the road or the real increase in his property values.
Yet taxation of approximate benefits will probably be necessary
because bidding by those who want roads will usually be skewed
by serious "free-rider" problems: each bidder will have
incentives to underbid because his expenditure will benefit
others who cannot be excluded from those benefits except at
prohibitive cost. Since each bidder will also benefit from the
expenditures of others, his rational response is to disguise his
true demand. Similarly, some persons, including some nearby
landowners, may well view the facility as a cost rather than as a
benefit, but there is, again because of "free-rider" effects, not
likely to be any effective market in which to reflect the disutility
to these residents.
Another sort of market failure stems from the difficulty of
making payment for access to facilities sufficiently fine-grained
to provide an answer to the specific issue around which highway
conflicts now rage: should this particular road or road segment
be constructed? For example, we might require a permit for the
use of the Smithville city streets, but we cannot feasibly require a
different permit for every street. The allocation signals which are
produced by the citywide permit may tell us to expand or to
contract the transportation resources deployed in the city, but
they will not tell us which particular streets to close or to expand.
Nor will these signals give us more than hints about the
economic feasibility of additions or substitutions in the form of
transportation modes not employing concrete and rubber tires.
A variation on this problem of the "coarseness" of pricing
signals involves pricing policy for connected road systems. The
highways criss-crossing Smithville presumably can carry both
local and through traffic. If we assume that these roadways are
owned by the city and are accessible to local residents through
the acquisition of a general permit to use city streets, some means
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for charging nonlocal or through users is required. Of course,
tolls might be charged these users, but charging tolls for short
segments may be prohibitively expensive. A less costly alternative might be a system of state charges for the use of highways
with rebates to the city, but the determination of appropriate
rebates to the city from the state license fee or toll system may be
either expensive or inexact. State ownership would, of course,
produce the same problems in reverse.
In each case, the costs of marketing roads cause demand
signals to diverge from the signals that would be produced by a
market uninhibited by these transaction costs. In light of this
divergence, the allocational efficiency of the market cannot be
guaranteed, and the desirability of market pricing becomes an
issue once again. The question is really how far off the allocation
signals must become before pricing should be abandoned; and,
in a sense, that is a nonsense question. We can never know how
far off the signals are, because by hypothesis there are market
failures which preclude the establishment of the perfect market
which would provide a basis for comparison. And, of course, if
we could confidently predict the operation of that market in its
absence, the use of market pricing would not be necessary.
Hence, we are left with the necessity of making a rough
judgment about whether a decision process which includes
pricing is superior to one which does not.
In some situations, national defense, for example, the freerider effects are so dominant that any attempt at pricing seems
frivolous. But the provision of transportation facilities and
services does not seem so dominated by the free-rider phenomenon. Long- and short-term permits, parking charges and,
in some circumstances, tolls are presently available means for
charging major classes or users a price for their use of roadways.
Moreover, a serious attempt to implement road pricing might
well solve a number of the "coarseness" problems that have been
posed. For example, electronic metering devices that would
make .toll collection much less costly are currently under
development in the United Kingdom. The utilization of
hardware of this sort could make possible a system of tolls which
would provide relatively detailed and continuous information on
aggregate demand for various types of road capacity at various
times and in various places. The discovery through the
imposition of such charges that users are willing to pay the costs
of providing a particular total capacity of hard-surface city
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streets may not solve the problem of where to build additions
when demand will support them, but it is nevertheless a highly
significant bit of information. When combined with the highway
engineer's trip-survey data and a projection that a proposed
facility will yield greater revenues than any alternative proposal
for meeting demand, one has at least a system for concluding that
the road improvement is prima facie justified. If, on the other
hand, aggregate demand, similarly expressed, is insufficient to
support the provision of a road at the current scale, strategies for
disposing of excess capacity, or for converting the facility to
other or better uses, would seem to be in order.
3.

A Composite Scheme

Nonetheless, few would want to relegate decisions entirely
to our admittedly imperfect market system, no matter what
refinements are made in toll collection. The significant external
effects of the transportation network on our total living
environment argue for some role in transportation investment
decisions for interests whose preferences cannot be expressed
through a functional market. One strategy for the inclusion of
these interests in the context of a pricing system would be simply
to consider positive and negative externalities as factors which
may overcome a prima facie case established by pricing. Under
such a system the proponent or opponent of road investments,
whose position was not supported by available market information, would have the burden of persuasion, and in carrying this
burden, information tending to show the existence and magnitude of positive and negative externalities would be the only
relevant evidence. In this context the discussion of specific
projects could be carried on with some intelligence because the
issue would be relatively clearly posed: should a public subsidy
of a specific amount be provided to offset costs, or should a
particular "penalty" be added to the costs of a project, because
certain estimable costs and benefits are not reflected in a market
system of allocation?
Without attempting to develop a detailed decision-process
model, I will sketch briefly a possible framework for making a
road investment decision in Smithville within a legal structure
which recognizes both the efficacy of road pricing and its
limitations. To take an example with limited parameters:
suppose that the city is experiencing a deficit in its transportation
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facilities account and is therefore seeking a project which would
increase its revenue. After analyzing what it knows about
existing and projected demand, the responsible department of
the city government, say the Department of Transportation,
proposes that certain street segments in the downtown area be
closed off and converted into parking lots. The agency estimates
that this will have an insignificant effect on the demand for
vehicle permits and will generate needed revenues from parking
fees.
Obviously such a project will have, or appear to have, a
deleterious effect on some property owners: those owners who
have property abutting the streets proposed to be closed and
whose access will be restricted by the project. Nor is it possible to
say to those owners that their remedy is simply to pay the city to
keep the street open, because the "free-rider" problems
mentioned earlier may intervene. The property owners, therefore, may want to make two sorts of objections to the proposal:
that it will not have the revenue producing effect predicted by
the Department because the estimates of parking demand are
faulty; and that negative effects on their property outweigh the
net gains to the city from the project.
Because either or both of these claims might be true, the
property owners should be provided a forum in which to attempt
to convince the city. A hearing might therefore be convened
before an independent authority, for example, the City Planning
Commission. At that hearing the Transportation Department
would submit its justification for the project, and the opposing
property owners would submit their data and arguments. While
the attributes of this hearing could be elaborated further,
perhaps it suffices to say that the hearing contemplated is one
having essentially the attributes of the current highway location
and design public hearings-with the added feature of an
independent forum.
A legislatie-type public process is necessary because
interests and officials other than the Department of Transportation and abutting landowners may'have a desire to participate in
order to bring additional positive and negative effects to the
attention of the Commission. But this should not mean that the
hearing will be as diffuse and unsatisfactory as current highway
public hearings. The narrower focus of the inquiry-Is this
project justifiable on efficiency grounds?-should provide a
clearer joinder of issues, and make reference of the dispute to an
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independent, quasi-legislative body sensible. Moreover, having
to convince an authority independent of the Transportation
Department that the project is justified will militate against the
unresponsiveness of project proponents which often prevents
meaningful exchanges in current highway hearings.
On the basis of its evaluation of the evidence and arguments
at the hearing, the Planning Commission would make a
recommended decision, to be accepted or rejected by the City
Council without further hearing or ex parte contact with
interested parties. Should the Council desire further information
from any source, it could request it but would be required to give
notice to all the participants in the previous hearing and allow
them to comment on the information or advice received.Judicial
review on issues other than a claim of failure to follow prescribed
procedures would be excluded.
This process of proposal, hearing and political decision
under the efficiency standard should also be expected to take
place under certain predetermined constraints. For example, all
projects might require Planning Department clearance for
conformity with the comprehensive plan, thus injecting into the
process the degree of "rational planning" that has been achieved
at the local level, and the taking of park or historic area property
for any transportation project might be prohibited. The
proponent of a transportation project might also be required to
canvass certain external effects, environmental impact, for
example, in its initial proposal. These constraints express prior
political consensus concerning the relationship of transportation
to other values, and they no more contradict the use of market
allocation in transportation decisionmaking than zoning
ordi26 9
nances contradict market allocation of land resources.
To be sure, the process just described will not eliminate
dispute. Much argument can be expected about the accuracy of
the predictions of consumer demand in an admittedly loose
pricing system, and the accuracy of "evidence" brought forward
to demonstrate positive and negative externalities could be
endlessly debated. Nor is it a neutral system. The prima facie
status of pricing indicators clearly gives priority to preferences
which can be expressed accurately through available markets.
2

69As previously noted, parallel decision processes may be established at regional,

state and national levels to deal with transportation decisions for which governments at
those levels have responsibility. Nor is it impossible to employ an efficiency criterion
through similar processes under a grant-in-aid system requiring intergovernmental
cooperation in transportation projects.
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Nor is the enfranchisement of interested but technically
unskilled parties a less difficult problem here than under the
current highway program. But the system described does have
some attractive features when compared with present criteria
and processes for deciding where and when to build roads: it
provides a systematic criterion for investment-allocational
efficiency-to replace the fuzzy and infinitely expansive notion
of "highway needs"; it provides a starting point for political
discussion of external costs and benefits; it presumes that
resources are scarce and that users pay the costs of their use.
Therefore, market intervention must be explicit and must be
justified on acceptable social welfare criteria. In short, it is a
system which requires that some hard questions about resource
allocation be confronted explicitly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The case that has been made for allocating resources to road
uses through some form of pricing is obviously not overpowering. Serious and difficult problems would have to be resolved
before such a scheme could be made operational. Yet it does not
seem unreasonable to urge a major national research effort to
develop those solutions. We currently have an intensely
frustrating system of public decisionmaking about transportation
investments-particularly road investments. That process is
producing increasing conflict, unsatisfying resolution of the
controversies which arise and, perhaps, mammoth misallocations
of resources. Moreover, alternative strategies, such as better
"planning" or increased "democratization," seem bankrupt in
the absence of basic criteria for judgment about highway needs.
An attempt to develop a system of road pricing would at least
address the basic issues.

